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ABSTRACT. This article develops an ideal of sentencing discretion as consisting in
suﬃcient dispositional ﬂexibility for the trial judge to set, on behalf of the polity,
reasonable terms for the continuance of relations with the oﬀender in view of his
crime. This ideal requires trial judges to have what may be termed ‘‘substantial’’
sentencing discretion: discretion that is exercised with direct reference to the values
and goals penal sanctions are expected to serve, and where it is this quality of value-
based engagement that provides the justiﬁcation for the decision. The article engages
with empirical research into sentencing that helps us address the strength of the case
for and against substantial sentencing discretion, and ultimately defends substantial
sentencing discretion on functional as well as ethical–political grounds.
Judicial discomfort with wide sentencing discretion is not unknown,
nor is it a thing of the past. Judge Marvin Frankel’s broadside against
the extent of sentencing discretion possessed by him and his brethren
in the 1970s, charging ‘‘lawlessness in sentencing’’, is a matter of
historical record.1 In a fairly recent Canadian Court of Appeal
judgment, we read that:
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it is notorious among judges … that one of the most controversial subjects,
both in theory and practical application is sentencing.… The proposition that
if judges knew the facts of a given case, they would all agree, or substantially
agree on the result, is simply not so. … Without reasonable uniformity of
approach to sentencing amongst trial and appellate judges …, many of the
sentencing objectives and principles prescribed in the Code are not attainable.
… This makes the search for just sanctions at best a lottery and at worst a
myth. Pretending otherwise obscures the need for [the] courts to … minimize
unjustiﬁed disparity in sentencing while maintaining ﬂexibility.2
Of course, no modern legal system leaves entirely unconstrained
sentencing powers to trial judges. There is a general division of labour
between the legislature and the courts, where the outer boundaries of
a court’s sentencing powers are set by the punishment types and
ranges authorised for certain kinds of oﬀences in the criminal code,
and where the code may also contain a statement of the aims of
sentencing, and/or lists of aggravating and mitigating factors to be
taken into account in the determination of sentence.3 There is also a
degree of internal institutional control of sentencing outcomes
through appellate review. In such a system, the sentencing decision is
thus anchored by legislatively authorised penalty ranges, and in
principle subject to corrective adjustment within the judicial branch
of government. Last but not least, there are often constitutional
principles that curtail the penal power of the state vis-a`-vis those
under its jurisdiction, for instance by prohibiting cruel and unusual,
or disproportionate, punishment.
The question addressed in this article is what type of sentencing
discretion a system of this kind should embrace. What eﬀorts, if any,
should be made to ensure that oﬀenders whose criminal behaviour
was of comparable gravity are sentenced to essentially identical
punishments? And what should judges focus on in reaching their
decisions – a pre-determined set of classiﬁcatory criteria from which a
certain punishment will follow in all cases of this kind, or speciﬁc
goals of punishment? In practice, the answers to these questions will,
in part, depend on further legal determinations made by the criminal
justice system in question. But what can be said in general terms
about the proper extent of sentencing discretion in a legal system
2 R. v. Arcand, [2010] A.J. No. 1383, 264 C.C.C. (3d) 134 (Alta.C.A.), para. 8.
3 Despite the existence of common law crimes this is now also largely true for a
common law system, such as England and Wales, where oﬀences created by legis-
lation now far outnumber common law crimes, some common law crimes (such as
murder) are subject to legislatively deﬁned punishments, and general sentencing
legislation also applies to sentencing for common law crimes.
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committed to the control of state power, respect for fundamental
rights and equality before the law?
This article defends a trial judge’s sentencing discretion on prac-
tical as well as ethical–political grounds. It develops an ideal of
sentencing discretion as consisting in suﬃcient dispositional ﬂexibility
for the trial judge to ensure that what he considers to be the most
appropriate penal sanction is imposed on a convicted oﬀender. The
appropriateness of the sanction is judged in terms of the overall task
and objective of the criminal justice process to set, on behalf of the
polity, reasonable terms for the continuance of relations with the
oﬀender in view of his crime. This ideal requires trial judges to have
what may be termed ‘‘substantial’’ sentencing discretion: discretion
that is exercised with direct reference to the values and goals penal
sanctions are expected to serve, and where it is this quality of value-
based engagement that provides the justiﬁcation for the decision. The
exercise of substantial sentencing discretion has three interrelated
features: it requires of the judge to engage with the morally salient
features of the case before him, including the question how the
punishment will aﬀect the oﬀender in human terms; sentencer and
sentenced experience the sentencing occasion as a moral interaction
where the judge imposes a sentence for reasons he can give and stand
behind; and its exercise preserves a judge’s sense of personal moral
responsibility for sentence he imposes.
Opponents of the view defended here are unlikely to argue against
any degree of sentencing discretion within the criminal justice sys-
tem.4 Rather, they will defend a set of constraints designed to min-
imise inter-judge disparity in sentencing outcomes. Such constraints
will typically (a) deﬁne and standardise factors pertaining to case
severity, (b) connect particular case severity values to speciﬁc penal
options within a narrow band, and (c) suppress the possibility that
judges, by emphasising diﬀerent sentencing goals, reach signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent outcomes in factually comparable cases.5 In doing so, such
4 Tata observes that ‘‘even the advocates of stricter numerical guidelines and of
expert systems’ have stressed that their work should not be seen as an attempt to
appropriate the proper exercise of judicial discretion but rather simply as an aid’ or
way … to structure’ the use of discretion in individual cases.’’ C Tata, ‘‘Account-
ability for the Sentencing Decision Process – Towards a New Understanding’’ in C
Tata and N Hutton (eds), Sentencing and Society: International Perspectives,
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002, 399, 401. See also T O’Malley, ‘‘Judgment and Calcula-
tion in the Selection of Sentence’’, in this issue, Part I.
5 These features and aims are emblematic of guideline systems.
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further constraints may well compromise or even remove substantial
sentencing discretion from trial judges.
The case against substantial sentencing discretion, which is re-
viewed in the ﬁrst Part of this article, builds on the right to equal
treatment of those subject to the authority of the law. Various
scholars, some judges, and numerous politicians have claimed that
the exercise of sentencing discretion generates unwarranted disparity
in sentencing outcomes; indeed, it is this concern that has driven the
development of sentencing guidelines in various jurisdictions.6 Tak-
ing a closer look at some of the empirical literature that has been
relied on to back up this claim, I suggest that the evidence for
unwarranted disparity may be weaker than often assumed. The dif-
ferences found appear to be largely traceable to legitimate sentencing
considerations and thus indicative of warranted rather than unwar-
ranted disparity.
The claim that sentencing discretion leads to problematic or unfair
sentencing outcomes then mainly comes to rest on the contention that
‘‘who sentences you’’ makes a diﬀerence to the kind and severity of
the sentence that an individual oﬀender receives, in that ‘‘the person
of the judge’’, including his or her personal beliefs, background, and
penal preferences, play out in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent sentencing deci-
sions for comparable cases. This is indeed supported by a consider-
able body of empirical research on inter-judge disparity in sentencing
outcomes. These ﬁndings probably provide the best evidence of the
presence of some idiosyncratic variation in sentencing outcomes
within the system.
The second Part of the article therefore addresses the question
whether we have good reason to suppress this potential source of
unwarranted disparity by signiﬁcantly curtailing the discretion left to
sentencers. I ﬁrst address the arguments traditionally raised against
such curtailment: that judges need suﬃcient ﬂexibility to respond to
6 For the U.S., see e.g. I H Nagel, ‘‘Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New
Federal Sentencing Guidelines’’ (1990) 80 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
883. Nagel was a Commissioner of the United States Sentencing Commission. The
political history of the Federal sentencing guidelines’ introduction is traced in K Stith
and J A Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, Ch. 1. For England and Wales, see A
Ashworth and J V Roberts, ‘‘The Origins and Nature of the Sentencing Guidelines in
England and Wales’’ in A Ashworth and J V Roberts (eds), Sentencing Guidelines:
Exploring the English Model, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. On the merits
and demerits of diﬀerent guideline methodologies, see further O’Malley, fn. 4 above,
Part II.
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the ‘‘uniqueness’’ of the cases before them, that curtailing their dis-
cretion is a threat to judicial independence, and that discretion is
necessary to allow room for mercy. These do not in my view suﬃce to
show that the proper performance of the sentencing function requires
judges to have substantial sentencing discretion in every case.
A stronger case for substantial sentencing discretion begins to
emerge when we turn our attention to the penal sentence’s distinctive
forward-looking function of setting reasonable terms for the polity’s
continued relationship with the oﬀender in respect of his crime. I
draw on empirical research involving interviews with judges, court-
room observations and case ﬁle reviews to show that decision-makers
who approach sentencing as a directly value-oriented decision tend to
seek, and often reach, moderate sentencing outcomes. Two factors
seem to be at work: First, such an approach heightens attention to
oﬀender-oriented considerations at sentencing. Second, it aﬀects the
decision-maker’s attitude to her decision. Judges’ descriptions of their
sentencing experiences strongly suggest that when sentencing requires
direct engagement with the public values and human interests –
including those of the oﬀender – at stake in the decision, then
(notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing decision is legally gui-
ded and restrained, and constitutes an exercise of authority on behalf
of the state) the decision-maker experiences it as a moral decision on
her part and has an acute sense of moral responsibility for the sen-
tence imposed. This decision-making context, moreover, means that
both sentencer and sentenced experience the sentencing occasion as a
moral interaction. In the convicted person this furthers a sense that
his own humanity is recognised and respected and that his human
interests have not counted for nothing in the selection of sentence. In
the sentencer it promotes humility and a search for constructive
punishments.
This is not, of course, to claim that a system which invests judges
with substantial sentencing discretion is without risk. In the ﬁnal sub-
section of Part II, I address how sentencers should, and shouldn’t,
have regard to the goals and values underpinning the criminal justice
system. In this discussion I connect the exercise of substantial sen-
tencing direction to an ideal of individualised, person-responsive
sentencing. The conclusion sets this ideal of sentencing in the broader
context of constitutional values.
Before I turn to the substance of my argument, I should point out
that I will not as such address the compatibility of substantial sen-
tencing discretion with guideline systems. In practice, this will depend
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on the design of the guidelines. While certain problems and phe-
nomena that have arisen under the U.S. federal sentencing guidelines
were – as I suggest in Part II – rooted in these guidelines’ removal of
substantial discretion from judges, it may be possible to design sen-
tencing guidelines that preserve and are indeed supportive of the
exercise of substantial sentencing discretion. This is a topic to be
explored on another occasion.
I THE CASE AGAINST SUBSTANTIAL SENTENCING DIS-
CRETION: DISPARITY RESEARCH REVISITED
The claim that sentencing discretion generates unwarranted disparity
in sentencing outcomes is supported by three interrelated assump-
tions: First, that comparable cases are sentenced diﬀerently by dif-
ferent judges; second, that these diﬀerences at least in part reﬂect
individual judges’ diﬀering penal-philosophical outlooks and/or
unconsidered biases and personal attitudes; and third, that it is on
account of inadequate constraints on sentencing that such diﬀerences
persist. Defenders of sentencing discretion, by contrast, usually insist
that sentencing, to be defensible, must be an individualised process
which would be inappropriately constrained by legal instruments that
prevent appropriate individualisation of sentences. While some con-
cede a degree of unwarranted outcome disparity but view this as a
cost that must be paid to preserve appropriate levels of discretion
within the system, others challenge the perception of unwarranted
disparity as such and insist that, at the end of the day, judges con-
verge both in approach and in sentencing outcomes, with discrep-
ancies being more apparent than real. Yet others suggest that the best
way to overcome unwarranted disparity, and avoid introducing fresh
grounds for unfairness through unwarranted uniformity, lies in
methods that harness the advantages of structured and self-reﬂective
decision-making while preserving ﬂexibility of outcomes within
broadly set boundaries.
My discussion in this Part focuses on studies that compare how
judges consciously arrive at their decisions. In doing so I do not mean
to deny that (like all human behaviour) judicial decision-making is
subject to heuristic shortcuts and aﬀected by subconscious attitudes
and biases. My focus falls on studies which address how sentencing
decision-making works at a conscious level because this – being the
level where deliberative processing of information and application of
identiﬁable legal criteria in the search for appropriate outcomes take
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place – is the level that legal modiﬁcations of the sentencing process
strive to inﬂuence.
1.1 Research Findings on Sentence Disparity
Establishing the existence of sentencing disparity as such is not
without its methodological diﬃculties and challenges.7 A large
number of studies rely on oﬃcial statistical data on sentencing out-
comes for the identiﬁcation of variations in sentencing patterns.8 As
many of these studies’ authors recognise, one diﬃculty in drawing
from these variations an inference to the unequal sentencing of
comparable cases is that it is often unclear how comparable these
cases really are.9 Most government statistics merely record the dis-
posal of the case by ‘‘lead oﬀence’’ for which an accused has been
convicted and sentenced. This does not allow researchers to assume
that the cases were of comparable severity, since both regional pat-
terns of criminality and regional prosecution policies may diﬀer and
aﬀect what sorts of cases reach the courts to be sentenced. For this
reason, disparity research has long tried to probe more deeply than
the surface level of outcome statistics, and researchers have employed
a range of diﬀerent methods in their eﬀorts to establish both the
existence of unwarranted disparity as such, and its possible causes.10
Unwarranted disparity in this context is the occurrence of signiﬁ-
7 For a good discussion of these, see P J Hofer, K R Blackwell and R B Ruback,
‘‘The Eﬀect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Dis-
parity’’, (1999) 90 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 239, 264–292.
8 For the kind of data available in oﬃcial statistics, see e.g. M Motivans, Federal
Justice Statistics, 2013 – Statistical Tables, NCJ 249150, Bureau of Justice Statistics
(March 2017); M R Durose, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 2004 –
Statistical Tables, NCJ 217995, Bureau of Justice Statistics (1 July 2017). For the
kind of analyses that this data makes possible, see W Rhodes et al, Federal Sen-
tencing Disparity: 2005–2012, Bureau of Justice Statistics Working Paper Series, WP-
2015:01 (22 October 2015) (with a speciﬁc focus on how to establish whether racial
disparities in sentencing exist).
9 Palys and Divorski put this succinctly: ‘‘[One] is… left to infer judicial variability
in sentencing from unexplained variance … But sensitivity to the lack of synonymy
between available’ and important’ data leaves one with a lack of closure, since one
cannot determine the extent of which one is actually observing the impact of judicial
variability, or merely the absence of important case data.’’ (T S Palys and S Divorski,
‘‘Explaining Sentence Disparity’’, (1986) 28 Canadian Journal of Criminology 347,
348).
10 For a review of recent studies, see J T Ulmer, ‘‘Recent Developments and New
Directions in Sentencing Research’’, (2012) 29 Justice Quarterly 1.
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cantly divergent disposals of comparable cases for which no adequate
explanation in terms of legitimate sentence grounds can be given.11
This adds the complication that such grounds may diﬀer between
jurisdictions, or in the same jurisdiction over time, and/or between
diﬀerent classes of oﬀenders. Most sentencing research occurs in re-
spect of oﬀences and classes of oﬀenders where the comparability of
cases, in reﬂection of the legally signiﬁcant criteria, is established with
reference to widely used indicators of the gravity of the oﬀending
behaviour (type and degree of harm, levels of culpability, aggravating
and mitigating factors pertaining to oﬀending context and motiva-
tion). Occasionally, however, studies concern oﬀenders where sen-
tencers are expected to tailor sentences to rehabilitative options and
needs.12 If the latter is the case, factors that go towards an oﬀender’s
rehabilitative potential would have to be incorporated into the
identiﬁcation of comparable cases before consistency of disposals can
be analysed.
Sometimes it is possible for researchers to base their study on a full
review of court ﬁles, which allows them to identify and record factors
generally accepted as relevant to sentencing outcomes.13 These
studies are particularly useful in providing nuanced insights into the
sentencing patterns of diﬀerent individuals and courts and are
therefore more helpful than bare statistical evaluations in identifying
unaccounted-for variations (or in ﬁnding that apparent variations
can largely be accounted for). A highly popular methodology is
vignette-based studies, where judges (and sometimes other judicially
trained personnel) are given hypothetical cases to sentence and often
asked to give supplementary accounts of the basis for their decision.14
11 The U.S. Panel on Sentencing Research noted, ‘‘[Sentencing] disparity exists
when like cases’ with respect to case attributes – regardless of their legitimacy – are
sentenced diﬀerently’’ (A Blumstein et al (eds), Research on Sentencing vol. 1, fn. 1
above, 72). See also A Ashworth, ‘‘Disentangling Disparity’’ in D C Pennington and
S Lloyd-Bostock (eds), The Psychology of Sentencing: Approaches to Consistency and
Disparity, Oxford: Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 1987, Ch. 3.
12 For an example of such a study, see A N Doob and L A Beaulieu, ‘‘Variation in
the exercise of judicial discretion with young oﬀenders’’, (1992) 34 Canadian Journal
of Criminology 35.
13 For one large study of this kind, see R Hood, Race and Sentencing, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992. Hood evaluated the case ﬁles of cases relating to 2,884
individuals sentenced in West Midlands Crown Courts in 1989.
14 For large studies of this kind, see e.g. K Clancy et al, ‘‘Sentence Decision-
making: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and the Extent and Sources of Sentence
Disparity’’, (1981) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 524 (conducted with 264
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These studies are particularly good at tracking participants’ reason-
ing processes and at testing whether their generalised and abstract
views ﬁlter through into the hypothetical case disposals. The hypo-
thetical nature of the exercise is, however, in itself a signiﬁcant
drawback. One can never be quite certain that an actual case which
exhibits the features of the hypothetical case would be perceived, and
dealt with, in the same way.15 Some of the most sophisticated studies
are able to combine diﬀerent methodologies, relying on statistical
data, case ﬁles, court observation, actual sentencing decisions and
additional questionnaires and/or in-depth interviews with the deci-
sion-makers concerned.16 Many of the in-depth studies, however, are
conducted with relatively small numbers of participants, raising dif-
ferent concerns about the generalisability of their ﬁndings. Studies of
the latter kind are also often not designed to test whether unwar-
ranted outcome disparity exists but to understand how, that is by
what mental processes, the sentencing decision is arrived at.
One of the consistent ﬁndings of the relatively coarse-grained
statistical analyses made possible by oﬃcial data on the disposals of
apparently comparable cases, is that sentencing patterns diﬀer be-
tween diﬀerent courts and regions in ways that cannot plausibly be
ascribed to hidden variations in the seriousness of the cases that come
before these courts.17 Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s various studies
Footnote 14 continued
active U.S. federal district judges); Palys and Divorski, fn. 9 above (conducted with
206 judges of the Canadian provincial courts); F Streng, Strafzumessung und relative
Gerechtigkeit. Eine Untersuchung zu rechtlichen, psychologischen und soziologischen
Aspekten ungleicher Strafzumessung, Heidelberg: v.Decker, 1984 (conducted with 522
judges, prosecutors and legal trainess in the Lower Saxony region of Germany). For
some concerns regarding the external validity of such studies, see N Lemon and R
Bond, ‘‘Some methodological problems in sentencing research’’, in Pennington and
Lloyd-Bostock, fn. 11 above, 46, 50–51.
15 Partridge and Eldridge, who distributed brief pre-sentence reports to 50 district
court judges and observed wide disparity in suggested sentences, call this the ‘‘paper
defendant’’ problem (A Partridge and W B Eldridge, The Second Circuit Sentencing
Study: A Report to the Judges of the Second Circuit, Washington, DC: The Federal
Judicial Center, 1974, 14).
16 A particularly sophisticated study in this regard is J Hogarth, Sentencing as a
Human Process, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. For a mixed methods
study using case ﬁles, courtroom observation and interviews with decision-makers,
see J Rumgay, ‘‘Custodial Decision Making in a Magistrates’ Court: Court Culture
and Immediate Situational Factors’’, (1995) 35 British Journal of Criminology 201.
17 For the U.S. context, see e.g. L P Sutton, Federal Sentencing Patterns: A Study
of Geographical Variations, Utilization of Criminal Justice Statistics Analytic Report
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noted that the standard disposals of certain frequently committed
crimes, such as drink-driving or speeding oﬀences, diﬀered markedly
between regions and sometimes even between neighbouring courts.18
Another frequent ﬁnding is (apparent) diﬀerences in the sentencing
patterns of urban and rural courts for comparably serious crimes.19
Sometimes marked diﬀerences in the handling of factually compa-
rable cases were observed even between diﬀerent benches and/or
individual judges of the same court.20 At the same time, research has
established that court practitioners (defence lawyers, prosecutors,
probation report writers, and of course judges) do not usually ﬁnd it
diﬃcult to identify ‘‘the ballpark’’ in which a particular case falls.21
Footnote 17 continued
No 18, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1978 (available at https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdﬃles1/Digitization/33685NCJRS.pdf) and J T Ulmer and B D
Johnson, ‘‘Organizational Conformity and Punishment: Federal Court Communities
and Judge-Initiated Guideline Departures’’, (2017) 107 Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 253. For Germany, relevant studies are discussed in W Frisch, ‘‘From
Disparity in Sentencing Towards Sentencing Equality: The German Experience’’, in
this issue, text at notes 15 to 23. For England and Wales, see esp. T Mason et al,
Local Variation in Sentencing in England and Wales, London: Ministry of Justice,
2007 (ﬁnding some variation in average custodial sentence lengths and large
variations in respect of custody rates in Magistrates’ Courts and the use of life
imprisonment and imprisonment for public protection sentences in the Crown
Courts across the 42 Criminal Justice Areas (CJAs) in England and Wales, with that
variation largely attributable to ‘‘marked exceptions…in a small number of CJAs’’
whilst ‘‘the majority of CJAs issued sentences broadly in line with the national
average’’ (ibid, 6 and 11)). An earlier Home Oﬃce Research Study had not found any
indications of strong regional variations in sentences imposed in Crown Courts for
various serious crimes (D Moxon, Sentencing Practice in the Crown Court, Home
Oﬃce Research Study No. 103, London: Home Oﬃce, 1988, esp. 57–59).
18 See e.g. R Hood, Sentencing the Motoring Oﬀender: A Study of Magistrates’
Views and Practices, London: Heinemann, 1972; H Scho¨ch, Strafzumessungspraxis
und Verkehrsdelinquenz: Kriminologische Aspekte der Strafzumessung am Beispiel
einer empirischen Studie zur Trunkenheit im Verkehr, Stuttgart: Enke, 1973.
19 T Austin, ‘‘The Inﬂuence of Court Location on Types of Criminal Sentences:
The Rural–Urban Factor’’, (1981) 9 Journal of Criminal Justice 305.
20 For relevant studies of Magistrates’ Courts, see e.g. R Hood, Sentencing in
Magistrates’ Courts: A Study in Variation of Policy, London: Tavistock, 1962; R
Tarling, Sentencing Practice in Magistrates’ Courts, Home Oﬃce Research Study
No. 56, London: HMSO, 1979; R Tarling, ‘‘Sentencing Practice in Magistrates’
Courts Revisited’’, (2006) 45 The Howard Journal 29. See also N Hutton and C Tata,
Patterns of Custodial Sentencing in the Sheriﬀ Court, Edinburgh: The Scottish Oﬃce
Central Research Unit, 1995.
21 This observation is ubiquitous in the empirical literature. See e.g. N Hutton,
‘‘Reﬂections’’ in Tata and Hutton, fn. 4 above, 575, 578.
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Sentencing takes place against a backdrop of strong local conven-
tions of which participants are aware.22 Such conventions do, how-
ever, remain localised unless particular eﬀorts are made to align them
across districts. While some legal systems appear committed to
eradicating such regional variation in sentencing,23 others do not
appear to perceive this as particularly problematic. Some may even
view this as reﬂecting legitimate judicial responsiveness in sentencing
to regional variations in the frequency of commission and the local
public’s perception of certain types of crimes.
Where legal systems permit such submissions, it is well known that
sentencing outcomes are strongly inﬂuenced by prosecutors’ sub-
missions regarding sentence.24 General instructions given to prose-
cutors regarding charging practice and sentencing submissions
increase consistency of prosecutorial decision-making and courtroom
agency, and thereby indirectly the similarity of sentencing outcomes.
Prosecutors’ submissions as to sentence may function not merely as a
heuristic anchor25 (as they invariably will) but may quite consciously
22 See e.g. M J Lipetz, ‘‘Routine and Deviations: The Strength of the Courtroom
Workgroup in a Misdemeanour Court’’, (1980) 8 International Journal of the Sociology
of Law 47; J T Ulmer, Social Worlds of Sentencing: Court Communities under Sen-
tencing Guidelines, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997; D B Johnson,
‘‘The multilevel context of criminal sentencing: Integrating judge and county level
inﬂuences in the study of courtroom decision making’’, (2006) 44 Criminology 259. For
Germany, see W Langer, Staatsanwa¨lte und Richter. Justizielles Entscheidungsverhalten
zwischen Sachzwang und lokaler Justizkultur, Stuttgart: Enke, 1994.
23 Clearly, concern about local variation in sentencing is one of the motivating
forces behind the introduction of guideline systems, along with heightened pre-
dictability of sentences, better legislative/administrative control of sentence levels,
and eradication of inter-judge disparity ascribed to idiosyncracies of judges’ per-
sonalities and viewpoints.
24 See e.g. B Englich and T Mussweiler, ‘‘Sentencing Under Uncertainty.
Anchoring Eﬀects in the Courtroom’’, (2001) 31 Journal of Applied Social Psychol-
ogy 1535; A Britton, Pressing for Sentence? An Examination of the New Zealand
Crown Prosecutor’s Role in Sentencing (30 September 2016). Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996867.
25 Psychological studies suggest that people deciding under uncertainty have a
tendency to unreﬂectively latch on to an initially suggested ﬁgure/outcome (the
‘‘heuristic anchor’’) and treat this as a starting point from which they make
adjustments. It follows that if the initial suggestion had been diﬀerent the same
decision maker would likely have reached a diﬀerent outcome.
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be treated as a de facto ceiling on the imposed sanction, with further
conventions on what is a normal and an unusual ‘‘discount’’ gov-
erning judges in the actual apportionment of punishment.26 That
said, if general instructions to prosecutors are drawn up and issued at
district or regional level, their eﬀect may not only be to standardise
outcomes within the district or region concerned but also to reinforce
and cement variations of outcomes across districts or regions.27
It is in studies of individual judges’ sentencing practices that re-
searchers have most often found indications of unwarranted dis-
crepancy.28 Saks and Hastie memorably comment that ‘‘It is
something of an embarrassment to observe the great range of sen-
tences that diﬀerent judges assign to apparently indistinguishable
crimes.’’29 Studies that have established such signiﬁcant variations
between diﬀerent sentencers (listed here in declining size of the group
of participants) include Streng (52230), Palys and Divorski (20631),
26 See e.g. P Van Duyne, ‘‘Simple Decision Making’’ in Pennington and Lloyd-
Bostock, fn. 11 above, 143, 145. The same can be said for Germany.
27 Frisch describes eﬀorts made in Germany in respect of some oﬀences to align
instructions given to prosecutors across the German regional states. See Frisch, fn.
17 above, text at note 66.
28 Many of these studies compare average sentence lengths by judges with pre-
sumptively comparable case loads over a period of time, using tests of varying
sophistication to ensure comparability. For a recent study of this type, see J M
Anderson, J R Kling and K Stith, ‘‘Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity:
Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’’, (1999) 42 Journal of Law and
Economics 271 (also reviewing earlier studies of this sort).
29 M J Saks and R Hastie, ‘‘Social Psychology in Court: The Judge’’ in H R Arkes
and K R Hammond (eds), Judgment and Decision Making, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1986, 255, 271.
30 Streng’s participants were a mixture of judges, prosecutors and legal trainees.
See Streng, fn. 14 above, 75.
31 Palys and Divorski’s participants were 206 judges of the Canadian Provincial
Courts (Criminal Division) of whom 45 per cent had been on the bench for less than
ﬁve years, 25 per cent for 5 to 10 years, 18 per cent for 10 to 15 years and 12 per cent
for more than 15 years. In total there were approximately 1,000 judges of this type at
the time. See Palys and Divorski, fn. 9 above, 351.
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Hogarth (7132), Gibson (2633), Maguire (1534), and Fitzmaurice and
Pease (235).
Hogarth’s and Gibson’s studies correlated outcomes of actual
sentencing decisions made by participating judges with in-depth
interviews designed to establish social and personal background
factors, and attitudes. Streng, Palys and Divorski, Maguire, and
Fitzmaurice and Pease used vignettes. These studies provide us with
important data to answer two questions: (1) in respect of which types
of cases is diversity (where diversity is found) most pronounced, and
(2) how strongly is this diversity linked to diﬀerences in individual
judges’ sentencing philosophies (the penal-philosophical approach
and attitude of the individual judge)?
1.1.1 Locating diversity
Vignette studies ﬁnd particularly clear diﬀerences between sentencers
in ‘‘on the cusp of custody’’ cases where a range of disposal options
appears potentially legitimate36; this ties in with evaluations of real-
life sentencing outcomes.37 Studies also ﬁnd highly divergent patterns
in cases where oﬀence and oﬀender considerations pull strongly in
32 Hogarth’s participants were 71 full-time magistrates in the province of Ontario
out of a total of 78 magistrates in the province who dealt with more than 700
criminal cases per year; a further ﬁve magistrates did not meet the caseload
threshold. See Hogarth, fn. 16 above, 24–25.
33 Gibson’s participants were 26 district judges from three South-Eastern districts
in Iowa. See J L Gibson, ‘‘Judges’ Role Orientations, Attitudes and Decisions: an
Interactive Model’’, (1978) 72 American Political Science Review 911, 912–913.
34 Maguire’s participants were 15 of a total of 54 district judges in Ireland. All 54
judges were invited to participate in the research; the participation rate thus lay at 28
per cent. See N Maguire, ‘‘Consistency in Sentencing’’, (2010) 10 Judicial Studies
Institute Journal 14, 32.
35 Fitzmaurice administered a vignette-based questionnaire (which she had already
used with 41 university students) to two Crown Court judges she had met at a
seminar; she also interviewed these judges. See C Fitzmaurice and K Pease, The
Psychology of Judicial Sentencing, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986,
89.
36 As shown by the results of Streng’s (fn. 14 above), Palys and Divorski’s (fn. 9
above, 358) and Maguire’s (fn. 34 above, 42) studies. Fitzmaurice’s vignettes were
composed of factual variations on a serious rape case well above the custody
threshold.
37 See e.g. R Douglas, ‘‘Does the Magistrate Matter? Sentencers and Sentence in
the Victorian Magistrates’ Courts’’, (1989) 22 Australian and New Zealand Journal of
Criminology 40 and the studies cited in fn. 18 and 20 above.
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diﬀerent directions, especially when the sentencing framework calls
for the individualisation of sentences and/or the incorporation of
rehabilitative concerns (young oﬀenders38) or instructs sentencers to
avoid custody in respect of certain classes of oﬀender (young; abo-
riginal; inﬁrm; carer), thus unseating ‘‘oﬀence seriousness’’ as the
primary determinant of sentence (a point which is discussed further
below). Where a range of optional alternatives to prison as well as a
range of optional ancillary disposal options is provided for by law,
judges appear to diﬀer quite markedly in the ‘‘packages’’ which they
would impose in cases they consider to be of comparable severity.39
By contrast, studies tend to ﬁnd less divergence or even high con-
vergence between diﬀerent judges in their suggested disposals for
cases located at the higher end of gravity.40
To some extent, the pattern of divergences is reassuring. The
greatest divergences typically arise in relation to cases where rea-
sonable sentencers may well diﬀer.41 Consider a particularly stark
38 Cf Doob and Beaulieu, fn. 12 above.
39 Palys and Divorski observe that ‘‘In the cases in which the possible sentence
range was the lowest … judges’ sentences ran the broadest possible gamut’’ (fn. 9
above, 358). In Maguire’s study, inconsistency in suggested sentencing outcomes was
most marked in the case that all judges considered the least serious one, with 13
diﬀerent suggested disposals including 7 diﬀerent types of non-custodial sentence (fn.
34 above, 42). Note that this would amount to ‘‘disparity’’ only if the diﬀerent
sanction packages diﬀered markedly in their severity. This is not obviously the case:
it may well be possible to establish a degree of equivalence of the severity of diﬀerent
‘‘sentence packages’’. This was not a point addressed in the research, where diﬀerent
packages of disposals were equated with sentence disparity.
40 Maguire, ibid, notes that suggested sentencing outcomes were most consistent
for what the participants considered to be the most serious case. High convergence in
the actual disposals of serious crimes by German courts emerged in the study by H-J
Albrecht, Strafzumessung bei schwerer Kriminalita¨t: eine vergleichende theoretische
und empirische Studie zur Herstellung und Darstellung des Strafmasses, Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot, 1994. Similarly, J Pina-Sanchez and R Linacre, ‘‘Sentence
Consistency in England and Wales: Evidence from the Crown Court Sentencing
Survey’’, (2013) 53 British Journal of Criminology 1118, found only minuscule dis-
crepancies in the sentencing of oﬀenders in assault, burglary and robbery cases after
controlling for the potential inﬂuence of nine common aggravating and mitigating
factors.
41 This is also true for Streng’s study (fn. 14 above), although his ﬁndings are less
reassuring in other respects. The ‘‘wing-span’’ of diﬀerence he found in relation to
what should have been a completely straightforward case to sentence (a car dealer
with relevant prior convictions sold a car at inﬂated price after turning back the
mileage reading) was relatively wide: 16 per cent of the participants would have
imposed a ﬁne, others imprisonment between 1 month and 18 months, with just over
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example from Palys and Divorski’s Canadian study. One of their
vignettes concerns an 18-year-old Native Indian from a ‘‘stereotypi-
cally deprived background’’ with a previous record of low-level
oﬀending who, together with a 29-year-old white man, commits a
burglary at the home of an elderly couple who are held at gun-point,
severely beaten and tied up. (Later in the same paper Palys and Di-
vorski refer to the facts as describing ‘‘a horriﬁc oﬀense which gen-
erated terror and humiliation in two elderly individuals in their own
home’’.42 Unfortunately one cannot get the ﬂavour of the vignette
fully as the published research only includes brief summaries of the
much richer vignettes presented to the participants.43) Proposed
sentences for this oﬀender ranged from a suspended sentence to
13 years imprisonment, with a median of 6 years imprisonment.44
One potentially very signiﬁcant legal factor (which Palys and Di-
vorski fail to draw the reader’s attention to) is that Canadian law
contains an explicit provision instructing courts to consider ‘‘all
available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in
the circumstances… for all oﬀenders, with particular attention to the
circumstances of Aboriginal oﬀenders’’ (section 718.2(e) Canadian
Criminal Code). This provision is interpreted as requiring judges to
use a diﬀerent, maximally prison-avoiding, approach to sentencing
for aboriginal oﬀenders.45
Footnote 41 continued
a third of these willing to suspend it. One must, however, bear in mind that the
participants in Streng’s study weren’t all judges but included prosecutors (who, as a
group, tend to ask for higher sentences than judges eventually impose) as well as law
graduates undergoing the second (practical) phase of their legal training. The
‘‘outliers’’ may well have come from this last group – perhaps suggesting that the
inexperienced judge may be the greatest risk factor in sentencing.
42 Palys and Divorski, fn. 9 above, 352 and 360.
43 As Palys and Divorski detail in another publication reporting on the same
study: ‘‘The case descriptions were intended to be as comprehensive as possible and
hence included a fairly detailed description of events leading up to the crime, a full
pre-sentence report on the accused (including prior record and social history), and
information concerning the eﬀects of the crime on the victim.’’ See T S Palys and S
Divorski, ‘‘Judicial Decision-making: An Examination of Sentencing Disparity
Among Canadian Provincial Court Judges’’ in D J Mu¨ller, D E Blackman and A J
Chapman (eds), Psychology and Law, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1984, 333,
335.
44 Palys and Divorski, fn. 9 above, 354.
45 R. v. Gladue 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 clariﬁes that the
aboriginal heritage factor must be given weight in sentencing of all oﬀences by such
oﬀenders, no matter how serious, albeit that in respect of the most serious oﬀences,
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The extreme discrepancy found in this case may then well reﬂect
the study participants’ good faith eﬀorts to follow the law’s impos-
sible-to-follow guidance of keeping indigenous oﬀenders out of
prison while still giving weight to the seriousness of their oﬀending
behaviour and the risk they pose to the public – resulting in a will-
ingness to interpret the instruction of the law as an instruction to
exercise what would otherwise be undue leniency, further encouraged
by the young age of the oﬀender in question. Legal provisions of this
kind force judges to make what in eﬀect is a ‘‘pathway determina-
tion’’ in the case before them. The inevitable result is strongly
divergent outcomes which may then mask what may well be complete
agreement between all judges concerned that the case is ﬁnely bal-
anced and could be taken down either fork in the road. Unless one
wants to prohibit legislatures from creating such ‘‘pathway options’’
altogether, one has to accept that these will increase outcome dis-
parity even among decision makers who are in substantive agreement
about what matters to the decision at hand and how to weigh and
balance the relevant factors against each other.
This observation is of wider application. Where the law oﬀers
sentencers a choice of (not obviously equivalent) disposals, and/or
where sentencers are instructed by law to give decisive weight to
factors beyond the gravity of the oﬀending behaviour as such that
have to be put on diﬀerent sides of a metaphorical scale, sentencers
are eventually forced to let one side of the scale determine the out-
come. This means that even if sentencers agree that the scales are
ﬁnely balanced, their subsequent decisions will not reﬂect the prox-
imity of their initial perceptions and evaluations. For each of them,
the set of factors on the preferred side of the scale will feed into the
outcome whereas the factors on the lighter side of the scale will no
longer be reﬂected in the sentence. Take a sentencer who must choose
between sentencing a young adult ‘‘as a young oﬀender’’, or ‘‘as an
adult’’ (this is what trial judges in Germany are instructed to do
under section 105(1) of the Youth Courts Act (Jugendgerichtsgesetz,
short JGG) in cases where the defendant was between 18 and 20 years
old when he committed the crimes in question). Diﬀerent sentencers
Footnote 45 continued
which call for protection of the public, denunciation and deterrence, aboriginal
factors may play less of a role. This decision post-dates Palys and Divorski’s study. It
stands to reason that at the time of their study there may have been signiﬁcant
disagreement among judges about how much weight should be accorded to the
aboriginal heritage factor in a serious case.
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may not diﬀer much in how they in a given case assess the factors that
aﬀect this determination (say, the degree of personal maturity of the
oﬀender). But once they have made their determination of which
sentencing regime should be applied, given the deep diﬀerences be-
tween those regimes, their actual sentences will diﬀer vastly.
Returning once again to Palys and Divorski’s aboriginal oﬀender,
it is plausible to assume that the participants who ‘‘sentenced’’ this
hypothetical 18-year-old did not disagree all that strongly on how
bad the crime was, or how culpable the oﬀender. But they had to bear
in mind the oﬀender’s relative youth and the policy of the law to keep
aboriginal oﬀenders out of prison (thus loosening the link between
crime seriousness and sentence severity for these oﬀenders). We
should not be surprised if some decided that the case still fell on the
‘‘leniency remains possible’’ side whereas others thought that it did
not.46 A case with these features would be diﬃcult to sentence in real
life, and very little can be drawn out from how people sentence it in
the abstract. In real life sentencers would undoubtedly try to bore
deeper into how the crime happened and who the person before them
was before settling on their view of the appropriate sentence.
1.1.2 Explaining diversity
One question that has stood behind many of these studies is whether
a judge’s personal views on the purposes of punishment makes a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence to sentencing outcomes. Judges clearly diﬀer in
their penal philosophies and attitudes. What is, however, less clear is
whether and how these diﬀerences in attitudes ﬁlter through into
individual case disposals. Gibson’s research suggested that the
potential relevance of a judge’s general social and political attitudes
on sentencing outcome depended on the judge’s conception of his
role.47 One of the often-quoted ﬁndings of Hogarth’s study of the
sentencing behaviour of magistrates in Ontario, which was designed
to tease out diﬀerences in the personal penal philosophies held by
magistrates and their eﬀect on sentencing behaviour,48 is that ‘‘vari-
ation in sentencing behaviour’’ (such as preferences for ﬁnes over
probation, and vice versa) was indeed ‘‘associated with variation in
the attitudes of the magistrates concerned’’.49 However, when Hog-
46 Palys and Divorski also highlight that disparity will be greatest when oﬀender
and oﬀence information strongly pull in diﬀerent directions (fn. 9 above, 359).
47 Gibson, fn. 33 above.
48 Hogarth, fn. 16 above.
49 Hogarth, ibid, 365.
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arth linked penalty selection to fact patterns it emerged that ‘‘the
facts most closely associated with length of sentence are the length of
criminal record and the severity of the crime’’.50 Moreover, from the
over 2,400 sentencing study sheets that the participating magistrates
had ﬁlled in, and in which they had reported on their reasons for
sentence in these cases, it was clear that ‘‘neither penal philosophy
nor the attitude scales distinguished magistrates in terms of the rat-
ings given to the severity of criminal acts’’.51 That said, an eﬀect
could have arisen by an indirect rather than a direct route. The
magistrates’ ‘‘[p]enal philosophy and attitude scores’’ were ‘‘closely
associated with the amount of premeditation seen in the commission
of oﬀences, and in the perceptions magistrates formed about
oﬀenders’ attitudes toward their involvement.’’52
The sentencing study sheets also indicated that some magistrates
rather crudely gave top weight to their preferred penal purpose in
every case that came before them.53 But while this might lead one to
suppose that the actual sentences imposed by magistrates of diﬀerent
penal-philosophical orientation would diverge strongly, the surpris-
ing result was that no strong divergences of this kind were found.
Instead, ‘‘It appeared that diﬀerent magistrates can achieve similar
sentences through quite diﬀerent mental routes.’’54 Hogarth himself
interpreted his data as establishing that ‘‘the judicial process is not as
uniform and impartial as many people would hope it to be’’.55 While
this may be so, the strongest link he found appears to have been
between magistrates’ individual sentencing philosophy and sentence
explanation, not between their sentencing philosophy and sentence
severity as such. Put diﬀerently: The judges’ diﬀering commitments to
diﬀerent penal aims were most markedly connected to how they ex-
plained and justiﬁed the chosen sentence, and to how they integrated
their sentencing decisions with their self-image.56 Actual sentence
severity, by contrast, was less closely linked to the judges’ penal
50 Hogarth, ibid, 348.
51 Hogarth, ibid, 274.
52 Hogarth, ibid, 274.
53 Hogarth, ibid, 289.
54 Hogarth, ibid, 289–290.
55 Hogarth, ibid, 365.
56 See also Hogarth, ibid, 299 (suggesting that magistrates may mentally ‘‘rear-
range the facts to ﬁt the types of sentences they use habitually’’) and his discussion at
376–378. Palys and Divorski also observe that ‘‘it appeared that many, if not most
judges perused case facts, chose salient ones, formulated legal objectives on this
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attitudes than it was to perception of certain facts which are stan-
dardly accepted as relevant.
Various other studies support the conclusion that actual sentences
are correlated more closely to perception of such facts, than they are
to penal attitudes. Fitzmaurice, in her small pilot study with two
crown court judges who she asked to ‘‘sentence’’ a series of paper
cases, found that ‘‘in the case of these two judges, 77 per cent and 98
per cent of variation in the sentence length was accounted for by
variation in judgments of oﬀence seriousness.’’57 Findings from
studies that combine qualitative interviews of judges with sentencing
case vignettes present a similar picture.58 While this provides some
reassurance that sentencers indeed base their sentencing decisions on
the gravity of the oﬀending behaviour, it also suggests an entry point
for hidden disparity. As Hogarth’s ﬁndings have already reminded us,
judgements of oﬀence seriousness and oﬀender culpability are
themselves not neutral or beyond the inﬂuence of diﬀerences in penal
attitudes.59 Sentencers’ diﬀering perceptions of oﬀence seriousness
and oﬀender attitude will quite obviously result in punishments of
diﬀering severity.
Another important source of unequal punishment for comparable
crimes is the diﬃculty of translating perceived levels of oﬀence seri-
ousness into sentences of matching severity. This also emerged in
Fitzmaurice’s pilot study, with Fitzmaurice observing that even jud-
ges who agree in their assessment of oﬀence seriousness may diverge
in their notions of the rate at which the severity of punishment in-
Footnote 56 continued
basis, and then proceeded to repackage’ case facts in a manner which showed
maximal harmony between legal objectives and case facts’’ (fn. 9 above, 358).
57 Fitzmaurice and Pease, fn. 35 above, 58.
58 Oﬀence seriousness was the best predictor of actual sentencing outcomes in
Sutton’s 1978 evaluation of the sentencing patterns of diﬀerent US courts (fn. 17
above); it also regularly emerges as the variable with the strongest explanatory value
in mixed methods studies such as Hogarth’s (fn. 16 above). See further the ﬁndings of
Jan de Keijser’s study with Dutch magistrates (JW de Keijser, Punishment and
Purpose. From Moral Theory to Punishment in Action, Leiden: Thela Thesis, 2000). S
Wheeler, K Mann and A Sarat concluded on the basis of interviews with 51 U.S.
Federal judges that the sources of disparity lie not in a lack of sentencing principles
but in variation in the ways these are transformed into actual sentences (Sitting in
Judgment: The Sentencing of White-collar Criminals, London: Yale University Press,
1988). Compare also the study by Palys and Divorski, fn. 9 above.
59 Consider the already-mentioned link that Hogarth found between sentencing
philosophy and perceptions of culpability.
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creases with its length. While hardly any sentencer appears to believe
that, in order to double the severity of a prison sentence, one needs to
impose a sentence of ‘‘twice the length’’ of the ﬁrst sentence, they
compress the length of the sentences they add in order to arrive at a
‘‘twice’’ or ‘‘three times as serious’’ punishment to diﬀerent degrees.
Hence substantial diﬀerences in sentence length could be accounted
for by judges’ diﬀering views on what punishment is ‘‘twice as seri-
ous’’ as another.60 The same point also applies to ‘‘conversion rates’’
between diﬀerent types of sanctions in systems where sanction types
are in certain ranges supposed to be interchangeable.61
1.2 Eradicating diversity?
This leaves the question whether anything could and should be done
to eradicate inter-judge variation in sentencing outcomes. In a per-
ceptive early discussion doubting that disparity undermines conﬁ-
dence in the system, Douglas points out that ‘‘a sense that sentences
are predictable may not mean that sentences are regarded as just.’’62
Instead, sentencing may come to be regarded as ‘‘a rather formulaic
activity which makes relatively little allowance for what defendants
60 Fitzmaurice and Pease, fn. 35 above, 89–90.
61 Interestingly, when Streng (fn. 14 above) designed his vignette study, he com-
pared the severity of punishments of diﬀerent kinds only after ‘‘converting’’ the
diﬀerent types of punishment into comparable units. Where participants proposed
the imposition of a ﬁne (which in the German system will be expressed as a set
number of ‘‘day ﬁnes’’, one day ﬁne being equivalent to the income an oﬀender does
or could earn in one day of work), Streng took that number as the unit of com-
parison (a proposed sentence of ‘‘30 day ﬁnes’’ thus equals ‘‘30’’). Where participants
proposed a non-suspended sentence of imprisonment, Streng applied a multiplier of
4 to the length of imprisonment to ﬁnd the unit of comparison (a proposed ‘‘non-
suspended prison sentence of 1 month (30 days)’’ thus equals ‘‘120’’). The conversion
rate between day ﬁnes and suspended sentences of imprisonment was multiplication
by 2. This was Streng’s rough-and-ready way of giving quantitative expression to
conventional beliefs about the relative seriousness of diﬀerent types of punishment.
Needless to say, diﬀerent individual participants might have picked very diﬀerent
personal multipliers, had they been asked. Streng’s conversion rate approach does,
however, reﬂect the deep-seated belief among practitioners that these sentence op-
tions are not of equivalent but of ascending severity, despite the fact that they are
equated 1:1:1 by the relevant legislative provisions. On this, see further S Harrendorf,
‘‘Sentencing Thresholds in German Criminal Law and Practice: Legal and Empirical
Aspects’’, in this issue, text at nn. 13–16 and 20–29.
62 Douglas, fn. 37 above, 51. Other scholars also argue that it is unclear that ‘‘such
disparities should be troubling per se’’ (R A Bierschbach and S Bibas, ‘‘What’s
Wrong with Sentencing Equality’’, (2016) 102 Virginia Law Review 101, 108).
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may regard as the special feature of their cases’’, resulting in ‘‘con-
demnation of a system … perceived as overly rigid and as charac-
terised by a refusal to recognise the distinctive features of each crime
and each defendant.’’63
In the next Part, we shall look at whether, and if so why, we have
reason to want relatively high levels of judicial discretion in the
system.
II THE CASE FOR SUBSTANTIAL SENTENCING DISCRE-
TION: RESPONSIVENESS AND RESPONSIBILITY-
TAKING IN THE COURTROOM
2.1 The Conventional Case for Sentencing Discretion
Judges often claim that broad sentencing discretion is crucial to their
ability to sentence oﬀenders appropriately but it can be diﬃcult to
explain why this is so. The most frequently heard arguments invoke
the ‘‘uniqueness’’ of each case, the preservation of judicial indepen-
dence, and mercy. Let us take a closer look at each of these.
2.1.1 ‘‘Uniqueness’’
Stated without further elaboration, the argument that wide sentenc-
ing discretion is necessary in order to enable judges to respond ade-
quately to the uniqueness of each case is quite weak. It is, of course,
undeniable that no two cases are exactly identical, and that any legal
rule is open textured enough to leave some leeway in its interpretation
and application. But it is equally true that many of the diﬀerences
observed in respect of facts that matter for the sentencing decisions
are too minute to signal that a distinction between these cases would
be appropriate on account of this diﬀerence. The ‘‘uniqueness’’ of
cases, moreover, cannot be seen as a denial of the possibility of
making comparisons between cases. Quite the contrary. Regarding
the ‘‘method’’ by which judges arrive at the sentence they impose in
an individual case, it is well known that sentencers sentence ‘‘com-
paratively’’ by relying on what they believe are similarities between
cases – and that it is this pattern of perceived similarities which in fact
enables practitioners to develop through experience and communi-
63 Douglas, ibid. A growing body of evidence from the U.S. discussed in sub-
section 2.4 below suggests that this has indeed been the case.
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cation such a clear sense of the area in which an individual case
falls.64 Empirical studies of sentencing suggest that sentencers
maintain consistency and achieve predictability by working with what
is essentially an analogical or associational method: they ﬁnd the
appropriate range/starting point for a sentence in any particular case
by grouping the case with other cases they perceive to be of com-
parable severity.65 As Hutton explains:
Judges are aware that they are members of a profession and co-workers in a
local criminal justice community. Court practitioners, including judges, have a
shared tacit understanding of the tariﬀ. While they would ﬁnd it very diﬃcult
to describe this tariﬀ explicitly, they would have little diﬃculty in reporting
from their own experience cases which they felt departed from the tariﬀ. They
know that one of the demands of justice is consistency. Part of their job as
sentencers is to try to treat like cases alike both in terms of their own personal
sentencing practice and in terms of the practice of other judges. In other words,
the notional tariﬀ’ which is produced through the negotiations of court actors
forms a structure underpinning the sentencing decision making of sentencers.66
To recognise that ‘‘the act of sentencing is fundamentally a compara-
tive process’’67 points to an inherent limitation of grounding sentencing
discretion in the alleged uniqueness of cases. Discretion-based sen-
tencing itself only works as a practice because it can rely on court
practitioners’ perceptions of similarities between cases – what Tata has
felicitously called ‘‘typical whole case stories’’68 – and the knowledge of
the individual judge of how she, and her peers, have previously dealt
with similar cases. It is therefore not immediately evident what would
be lost if a standardisation of punishments structured around some-
thing like a ‘‘typical case’’ model were to be attempted.
64 This was apparently ﬁrst pointed out by Hood in his study of the sentencing
practice of magistrates (Hood, fn. 20 above, 16).
65 C Tata, ‘‘Conceptions and Representations of the Sentencing Decision Pro-
cess’’, (1997) 24 Journal of Law and Society 395, 396. For Germany, Schier has
remarked that ‘‘What emerges in practice is a system of comparative sentencing in
conjunction with the rest of the judiciary’’ which has a high level of support from the
judges he interviewed, especially regarding sentences for less serious and very fre-
quent types of cases (J-T Schier, Die Bestimmtheit strafrechtlicher Rechtsfolgen,
Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2012, 219).
66 Hutton, fn. 21 above, 578.
67 Tata, fn. 65 above, 396.
68 Tata, ibid, 412. Interchangeably, Tata also speaks of ‘‘typical whole oﬀence
stories’’.
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2.1.2 Judicial independence
Another argument frequently put forward to ground the case for
substantial sentencing discretion is that of judicial independence. Be-
fore the introduction in England and Wales of a duty on every court
to ‘‘follow any sentencing guidelines… relevant to the oﬀender’s case
… unless the court is satisﬁed that it would be contrary to the interests
of justice to do so’’ (section 125(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act
2009), the Magistrates’ Association criticised an earlier draft of this
provision as a threat to judicial independence. Ashworth called this a
‘‘strange and unsupportable use of that concept [of judicial indepen-
dence]’’ since ‘‘Nothing in the Bill prevented courts from deciding
cases impartially, without fear or favour’’, and, while the Bill did set
out to constrain sentencers’ discretion, ‘‘there is no doubt that Par-
liament may lawfully create mandatory sentences if it wishes’’ which
he considered ‘‘regrettable, but not unconstitutional.’’69
But this may be too quick a dismissal of this point. The reference
to judicial independence here may have to be read more broadly, as a
reference to the appropriate division of roles between judges, legis-
lators, and governments in collectively providing citizens with a
system of government that is respectful of people’s dignity and rights.
The proper performance of the judicial function may require more
than that decision makers avoid favoritism and need not fear repri-
sals or be motivated by the prospect of rewards for decisions that
would curry favour with the government. We may be rightly con-
cerned at the prospect of a system where sentencing judges merely
‘‘pronounce’’ sentences that have already been decided upon by other
people, elsewhere. This is a point we will need to return to in our
subsequent discussion, after stating brieﬂy the third most frequently
used argument in defence of broad sentencing discretion.
2.1.3 Mercy
Wide sentencing discretion is sometimes defended in order to make
room for mercy. But mercy, as one of the judges interviewed by
Brown in his recent exploration of sentencing practice in Scotland
makes clear, is in issue only after the usual range of mitigating factors
has been considered, and exhausted.70 While an important safety
69 A Ashworth, ‘‘The Struggle for Supremacy in Sentencing’’, in Ashworth and
Roberts, fn. 6 above, 15, 30.
70 ‘‘Mitigation gets you to your headline sentence, taking everything into account.
Mercy would then come in when, having considered everything, you think, well, that
is the sentence that is appropriate for that person in all the circumstances of this
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valve – allowing the judge to recognise that there are things in this
world more important than punishment of the guilty, and that the
case in front of her falls into this category – it is thus invoked by a
sentencing judge in comparatively few and rather exceptionally
structured cases. In Jacobson and Hough’s study of mitigation, one
of their respondents ‘‘described as showing mercy’ his decision to
pass an unexpectedly short custodial sentence on a proliﬁc burglar
whose long-term partner was clearly in the late stages of terminal
cancer’’,71 and this indeed provides an excellent example of how
mercy operates in sentencing as an independent public value. What
perhaps is still in some sense an unduly lenient sentence is passed
because we should all prefer to live in a world where someone, proliﬁc
burglar or not, should not be forced to abandon a very sick partner in
the ﬁnal months of their partner’s life. Avoiding such an outcome not
only shows compassion for the partner but, just as importantly,
acknowledges the defendant as someone whose ethical existence
cannot be reduced to the ‘‘life of crime’’ he leads but also involves
forming important interpersonal relationships and doing his duty by
those to whom he stands in such relationships.72
The case for substantial sentencing discretion to exist in every case
that comes before a judge, however, must rest on something else. To
develop it properly, we need to ask about the function of the sen-
tencing judgment, which is the issue to which I turn next.
Footnote 70 continued
case.’’ G Brown, Criminal Sentencing as Practical Wisdom, Oxford: Hart/Blooms-
bury, 2017, 87 (quoting a Scottish sheriﬀ).
71 J Jacobson and M Hough, Mitigation: The Role of Personal Factors in Sen-
tencing, London: Prison Reform Trust, 2007, 40.
72 Classic other instances where sentencers exercise mercy are in sentencing
oﬀenders whose oﬀending behaviour has already resulted in overwhelming personal
costs (say, the traﬃc oﬀender whose own child was killed in the resulting accident)
and oﬀenders whose health is so miserable that they cannot receive adequate
treatment or would die in prison. Mercy in this sense responds to what von Hirsch
and Ashworth call ‘‘equity factors’’ at sentencing. Von Hirsch and Ashworth con-
sider responsiveness to equity factors legitimate when and to the extent that the
compassion or sympathy shown to the oﬀender ‘‘rests on quasi-retributive grounds,
related to the values underlying the desert rationale’’ (A von Hirsch and A Ash-
worth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2005, 175). To my mind equity factors are best understood and justiﬁed
more broadly as factors that, in a system that has retained a sense of the relative
moral importance of state punishment versus other morally important aims and
values, should lead to a de-emphasising of the need to punish.
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2.2 The Function of the Sentencing Judgment
Consider a typical penal sentence, where a person is convicted of, say,
residential burglary and theft of goods worth £100, and as punish-
ment is sentenced to a ﬁne of £500 and 50 h of community service.
Three interrelated points are worth observing.
First, this is clearly a special kind of judgment: it is, as one might
say, ‘‘creative’’ of legal relations in a way that most other court judg-
ments are not. Think, by way of contrast, of an action for payment of
an agreed sum under a contract. The judgment in favour of the clai-
mant merely ‘‘ﬁnds’’ that the defendant is obliged to pay this sum; it
does not as such bring this obligation into being. The obligation to pay
the speciﬁed sum under the contract already existed before judgment
was rendered; the judgment merely conﬁrms that this was so. Similarly,
when an action for damages in tort is brought, the obligation that is
being enforced – although not identical to the primary obligation which
the defendant tortiously breached – is in a direct, logical way linked to
the primary obligation: it continues the primary obligation in a trans-
formed shape. For this very reason, it can be eﬀectively fulﬁlled even in
the absence of a court order. My payment of the sum that it takes for
you to repair your car which I bumped into when reversing my car
fulﬁls the (secondary) obligation that has arisen from my breach of my
(primary) obligation to drive my car with due care and attention, and it
does so whether or not I pay up immediately or only after you have
successfully sued me for damages. By contrast, the legal relationship
that obliges the burglar in our example to undergo the speciﬁed pun-
ishment is created only by the sentence passed by the trial court.73
This leads to the second observation. When a court sentences an
oﬀender, the punishment for the crime is necessarily of the court’s
making.74 Whereas the defendant in our example was ‘‘liable to
73 To be sure, the criminal court’s sentencing decision is not uniquely special in this
way. Some judgments rendered in the civil courts also create new legal relations be-
tween the parties (a judgment setting out arrangements post-divorce may be a case in
point). Note also that, in criminal matters, the relevant legal relationship may some-
times be created by other institutional actors exercising an authority vested in them to
dispose of this kind of case. Moreover, where the system provides for the diversion of
certain cases to non-institutional settings the legal relationship can arise from a
settlement reached in this diversionary (usually restorative justice) framework.
74 As a technical legal point this has been observed long ago by German writers on
criminal procedure. See e.g. E H Rosenfeld, Der Reichs-Strafprozess: Ein Lehrbuch,
Berlin: De Gruyter, 1912, 31. The same point applies to other institutional (or
institutionally authorised) actors who conclude a criminal case by way of a binding
sanctioning response.
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punishment’’ for his burglary from the very instant he committed his
crime, he only became liable to ‘‘pay a ﬁne of £500 and undergo 50 h
of community service’’ in respect of it once the trial court had ruled
that this is to be his punishment. The commission of the crime has no
automatic eﬀect in bringing a particular punishment down upon the
oﬀender’s head. What the crime brings about is merely the creation of
a vulnerability (or, if you prefer, ‘‘liability’’) to being punished
according to law. It authorises an oﬃcial punitive reaction but it also
needs a sentencer to give eﬀect to this by determining the sanctioning
response in the individual case.
The ﬁrst and second point have to do with a third feature of
criminal punishments: There is no obvious or self-evident way in
which breaking and entering into another person’s premises and
taking away some of their things from them ‘‘equates to’’ or
‘‘translates into’’ a payment of £500 to the state, and 50 h of com-
munity service. The reason this is so is because (to the extent that
doing these things is a burden on the oﬀender), this is not a burden or
harm that has already been brought about by the criminal act. Penal
sentences do not reallocate existing harms. They are burdens that are
freshly created in response to the crime.
The creative dimension of the penal sentence suggests that we ought
not to look at it as merely executing a sanction already incurred by the
commission of the crime. Rather, the sentence is part of an interaction
that is irreducibly not merely past- but also future-oriented. Looking
forward, the sentence of the trial court sets the terms for the polity’s
continued relationship with an oﬀender in respect of his oﬀence.When
the burglar in our example is sentenced to a ﬁne of £500 and 50 h of
community service, he is in eﬀect told that ‘‘Sentencing you to a ﬁne of
£500 and 50 h of community service lays down the terms on which we’
– the members of this polity, the people’ in whose name you are being
judged – will continue our relations with you.’’
Understood as part of an interaction that is not merely backward-
but also forward-looking, sentencing is focused on ﬁnding a way
forward that is reasonable for all concerned. The ‘‘concern is no
longer simply what happened during a crime, but also what to do
with the convicted criminal in light of his, the victims’, and society’s
needs’’.75 For this reason, as Berman and Bibas point out, sentencing
‘‘necessarily incorporates oﬀender-oriented considerations’’.76
75 D A Berman and S Bibas, ‘‘Making Sentencing Sensible’’, (2006) 4 Ohio State
Journal of Criminal Law 37, 54–55.
76 Berman and Bibas, ibid.
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Empirical research on sentencing can tell us a lot about how such
considerations can be incorporated into the sentencing decision, and
it is to this research that I now turn.
2.3 Oﬀender-Oriented Considerations at Sentencing
Two prominent themes emerge in courtroom observations and judi-
cial interviews: (1) How hard judges try to avoid imprisoning
oﬀenders, and (2) how strongly judges strive to build up a picture of
the person in front of them, believing this to be crucial for the sen-
tencing decision they are about to make. A third, connected issue is
trying to understand what motivates these eﬀorts.
2.3.1 Avoiding imprisonment
As the Canadian judge Renee Pomerance pointed out: ‘‘Many of us
have seen cases in which an oﬀender on paper’ is deserving of a jail
term but in person’ is deserving of another chance.’’77 But how do
judges arrive at that conclusion?
Hough, Jacobson and Millie conducted an extensive study of
courts’ decisions in ‘‘on the cusp’’ cases where sentencers believed
that the case might potentially call for a custodial sentence. Their
courtroom observations led them to conclude that:
In cusp decisions, it was clear that sentencers were casting around for some
reason to avoid a custodial sentence. This could be an indication – of any kind
– that a proliﬁc oﬀender was willing and able to change his or her oﬀending
behaviour, or that a ﬁrst-time oﬀender would not oﬀend again. In a sense,
therefore, the process of sentencing of cusp cases can become a search for hope
– even a glimmer of hope – that can justify a non-custodial sentence.78
One of Tombs and Jagger’s respondents in their study of decisions to
imprison similarly stressed that he would ‘‘look for something’ that
indicates that there was real hope’ – a real prospect [of rehabilita-
tion], not a pie in the sky sort of thing… that’s what would persuade
me to go for a community sentence’’’.79 Such eﬀorts to avoid custody
whenever a sentencer perceives that a plausible custody-avoiding
77 Justice R M Pomerance, ‘‘The New Approach to Sentencing in Canada:
Reﬂections of a Trial Judge’’, (2013) 17 Canadian Criminal Law Review 305, 314.
78 M Hough, J Jacobson and A Millie, The Decision to Imprison: Sentencing and
the Prison Population, London: Prison Reform Trust, 2003, 41.
79 J Tombs and E Jagger, ‘‘Denying Responsibility: Sentencers’ Accounts of their
Decisions to Imprison’’, (2006) 46 British Journal of Criminology 803, 816.
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sentencing option exists are made across penal systems. Van
Oorschot, Mascini and Weenink concluded, based on ethnographic
data gathered in a type of Dutch criminal court where the sentencing
powers of the court go up to one year of imprisonment only, that
‘‘judges focus on the question whether the defendant has demon-
strated that he or she has made a change’ or turned things around in
their life’’’ and ‘‘seek for evidence that the defendant has truly
transformed himself or herself’’.80 In concrete terms, this meant that
‘‘the judges studied here routinely check if the defendant has sought
help for drug- or alcohol-related issues, for instance, and gauge to
what extent the defendant shows himself/herself a functioning adult’
with a job or a meaningful way to pass the day’, for example, by
going to college or through volunteering.’’81
Of course, the existence of legislation that instructs sentencers to
explore non-custodial options, and to only impose imprisonment in
cases where it is ‘‘unavoidable’’, is part of the backdrop against which
sentencers search for alternative disposals. But such legislation is
anything but a magic bullet to keep custodial sentences at a mini-
mum.82 The motivation for judges to attempt to avoid imprisonment
that emerged from these interviews with judges and courtroom
observation is that they endorsed this objective morally. This
endorsement was in turn rooted in their perception that many of the
people before them were ‘‘here because of misfortune, mental illness,
a combination of them’’,83 misﬁts rather than crooks, unlucky rather
than evil, that prison is a frightening experience for many and often
just a way of making their lives go worse,84 and that, if they imposed
a custodial sentence, it would be their decision to make the defen-
dant’s life go worse in this particular way, for which they would have
to carry a moral responsibility.85 This last point is well expressed by a
80 I van Oorschot, P Mascini and D Weenink, ‘‘Remorse in Context(s): A Qual-
itative Exploration of the Negotiation of Remorse and Its Consequences’’, (2017) 26
Social and Legal Studies 359, 365.
81 Van Oorschot et al, ibid.
82 See J V Roberts and L Harris, ‘‘Reconceptualising the Custody Threshold in
England and Wales’’, in this issue.
83 Brown, fn. 70 above, 85 (quoting a Scottish sheriﬀ).
84 For relevant quotes from sentencers, see e.g. Rumgay, fn. 16 above, 205, Tombs
and Jagger, fn. 79 above, 808.
85 Tombs and Jagger, ibid, assert that sentencers ﬁnd ways of denying their
responsibility for this decision. This is their interpretation of sentencers explaining
their decision to imprison by saying things like ‘‘the point had been reached where
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magistrate in one of Hough et al.’s focus groups, who said that when
sending an oﬀender to custody, ‘‘it is something that you will reﬂect,
that you have taken the responsibility with a couple of others of
depriving someone of their liberty’’.86
In pointing to the fact that the judges observed in these studies
were morally ‘‘self-motivated’’ to minimise their use of imprisonment,
I do not wish to create the impression that this attitude is universal
among judges. Indeed, it is clear that not every judge shares that
motivation.87 What I want to draw attention to is the connection
between the existence of that motivation and the parsimonious use of
imprisonment, and the fact that both of these appear to be connected
to the extent to which judges engage with oﬀender-oriented factors at
sentencing. This last point is addressed further in the next sub-sec-
tion.
2.3.2 Seeing oﬀenders for who they are
The sentencers observed in these studies saw themselves very much as
responding to the person of the oﬀender. They wanted to understand
the kind of person they were imposing their sentence on. If they had
to sentence someone who shared the values of the law and blamed
himself for having violated these values, they often opted against
custody whereas a non-attuned oﬀender was given a wake-up call.
This is again brought out in research from diﬀerent jurisdictions. Van
Oorschot et al. cite a judge who had to sentence ‘‘a couple of young
guys charged with armed robbery of a store’’. From their demeanour
in court he had concluded that they ‘‘were indiﬀerent, they didn’t see
the gravity of what they’d done.’’ So he sentenced them ‘‘accord-
Footnote 85 continued
custody was unavoidable’’. To my mind their interpretation is problematic. To say
‘‘the point was reached where I simply had no other choice but to do X’’ is a claim by
which one asserts one’s responsibility: one has concluded that doing anything other
than X would not be reasonable any more.
86 Hough, Jacobson and Millie, fn. 78 above, 35.
87 One respondent in Brown’s study indicated that he was quite prepared to im-
pose a custodial sentence on a proliﬁc petty oﬀender with, say, drug abuse issues, to
whom some of his colleagues might show greater forbearance, because ‘‘It’s the
ordinary people who need our protection’’, so no-one can come along thinking that
their ‘‘choice to be on drugs should entitle [them] to some special favour’’ (Brown, fn.
70 above, 86). This sentiment may well be shared by a number of other judges. As
apparent from this quote, it is connected to a choice on the part of the judge to turn
his attention away from the oﬀender to what he perceives to be the interests of the
public.
IN DEFENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION
ingly’’ – harshly enough for the judge to expect that that would make
them understand the seriousness of what they’d done.88 Tombs and
Jagger from their ﬁeldwork in Scotland mention a case of a 31 year
old ﬁrst oﬀender charged with dangerous driving and drink driving
who was sentenced to imprisonment by a sheriﬀ to whom it had
become ‘‘quite clear that this man had no conception that there was
anything really wrong with his driving. He was… sitting there lis-
tening to his lawyer talking with an extremely arrogant sort of look
on his face, as if to say what are they worried about?’’’89 On the
ﬂipside, Jacobson and Hough describe the case of a 47 year old
neighbour who after a series of grave disturbances ‘‘lost the plot’’
with the father of the loutish, abusive brood next door and waved a
knife at him – and who would have controlled himself better, had he
not allowed his drinking to get out of hand. This man clearly gen-
uinely felt bad that he had behaved like this. The incident had been a
wake-up call for him to seek help with his drinking. So there was no
need for a lesson-teaching, seriousness-asserting message to be sent to
him through the act of punishing him. The oﬀender himself com-
pletely acknowledged the wrongness of what he had done and had
reacted constructively – suggesting to the judges that the reaction of
the oﬃcial system could be milder.90
Recognising and responding to moral and practical eﬀorts made
by an oﬀender was considered important by sentencers. During the
trial and sentencing hearing they looked speciﬁcally for signs of
redeemability.91 A strong indicator of redeemablity could be genuine
contrition. One of Jacobson and Hough’s respondents commented:
‘‘I know there are actors in the dock as much as on stage … but it’s
easy to under-estimate the importance of the face-to-face contact you
have with the oﬀender – particularly if you take the trouble to make
eye contact’’.92 The same respondent then added that ‘‘while he might
be conned’ by a defendant pretending to be remorseful, I’d rather
88 Van Oorschot, Mascini and Weenink, fn. 80 above, 365.
89 Tombs and Jagger, fn. 79 above, 816.
90 Jacobson and Hough, fn. 71 above, 20.
91 P Mascini et al, ‘‘Understanding Judges’ Choice of Sentence Types as Inter-
pretative Work: An Explorative Study in a Dutch Police Court’’(2016) 1 Recht der
Werkelijkheid 32 (observing that ‘‘Judges select and weigh information to create an
image of defendants’ redeemability’’).
92 Jacobson and Hough, fn. 71 above, 48–49.
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make that mistake than ﬁnd a [genuinely] repentant, reformed of-
fender and reject his pleas’’’.93
When sentencers see it as part of their task to respond to the
person of the oﬀender, sentencing acquires aspects of an everyday
moral interaction between the oﬀender and the sentencer. In partic-
ular, judges have been observed to ‘‘try to build up a rapport’’ with
the oﬀender, something that gives them conﬁdence in their more
constructive sentencing responses. Jacobson and Hough mention a
judge who ‘‘talked of a case in which he passed a drug treatment and
testing order on a husband and wife who were, he felt, worth taking a
gamble on’. He has been pleased to see both of them getting them-
selves into a position to take up employment and to have their six
children returned to their care by social services.’’94 They also observe
that it was not at all rare for judges to reserve breaches of community
orders to themselves so that they could see how the oﬀender was
doing. These judges, they say, often ‘‘build a kind of relationship with
the defendant’’ where they take genuine pride in seeing oﬀenders
succeed in getting their lives back on track.95
Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence supports the conclusion
that the consideration of personal factors in the sentencing context is
strongly (albeit not invariably) linked to moderation.96 This should
not surprise us. Rumgay, whose study of custody decision-making in
93 Jacobson and Hough, ibid, 49. See also Mascini et al, fn. 91 above, 38 (ob-
serving ‘‘three types of decisions judges made: ﬁrst, wherein all signs noticed by
judges pointed in the same direction …; second, wherein judges weighed signs
pointing in opposite directions; and third, wherein judges elicited signs of hope and
remorse before choosing sentence type’’).
94 Jacobson and Hough, ibid, 51.
95 Jacobson and Hough, ibid, 50. By pointing to such forms of moral interaction
between sentencer and sentenced I do not wish to imply that state punishment can, or
should, be construed as a dialogic exchange of the sort postulated by some com-
municative theories of punishment. This is quite a diﬀerent question. For a helpful
discussion of some of the diﬃculties these theories encounter, see K Brownlee, ‘‘The
Oﬀender’s Part in the Dialogue’’ in R Cruft, M H Kramer and M R Reiﬀ (eds),
Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duﬀ, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011, 54.
96 Jacobson and Hough, ibid, passim. This has also been the view of the courts: In
Williams 337 U.S. 241 (1949), the court suggested that allowing judges to better
understand oﬀenders’ characteristics and circumstances has ‘‘not resulted in making
the lot of oﬀenders harder’’, emphasising that ‘‘a strong motivating force…has been
the belief that by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted oﬀenders
many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and
useful citizenship.’’ (249).
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a city magistrates’ court found parsimonious use of custody in a
decision-making environment that furthered a ‘‘discursive approach’’
and ‘‘favour[ed] personalized information about oﬀenders’’, ex-
plained this ﬁnding by drawing attention to a considerable number of
studies in which ‘‘[e]xposure to individualized, case speciﬁc infor-
mation has been found to attenuate opinions of the oﬀender’s cul-
pability and deserved punishment which might be expressed at a
general level about a type of crime’’, and suggested that ‘‘Successful
mitigation manipulates this process by pointing out information
which increases sentencers’ attention to, and reasoning about, the
circumstances in which a particular oﬀence has been committed.’’97
This is probably true both in legal systems where sentencing is a
highly regulated and hemmed-in activity and in systems where judges
are given considerably more elbow-room. But the prospects that a
sentencer will respond appropriately to personal factors are greater in
systems that call for a directly value-oriented sentencing decision than
in systems that require sentencers to take a more formalistic ap-
proach. An important reason for this is that, as Rumgay suggests,
‘‘mitigation represents a social psychological process of sympathetic
identiﬁcation with an oﬀender, rather than the accumulation and
aggregation of objective facts’’.98 In the reality of sentencers’ deci-
sion-making, a process of sympathetic identiﬁcation is more likely to
occur when mitigation is not so much a separate stage or checkpoint
in a sentencer’s deliberations but part and parcel of the sentencer’s
assessment of the various aspects of the case in the context of arriving
at a properly individualised sentence.99 The signiﬁcance of mitigating
factors might thus well be suppressed by a more formalistic sen-
tencing regime. Such a regime might moreover require of judges to
take account of such factors by way of what the system labels an
irregular event – a ‘‘downward departure’’ from what would ‘‘in
principle’’ be warranted, as opposed to the main guiding considera-
tion in ﬁguring out what is the warranted response. This might prime
97 Rumgay, fn. 16 above, 208 (references omitted).
98 Rumgay, ibid.
99 Sentencers might not even think of what they are doing as ‘‘mitigation’’.
Jacobson and Hough record their surprise that ‘‘many of our respondents were
hesitant or reluctant to generalise about the kinds of personal mitigation that
inﬂuence their sentences’’, and mention two respondents who initially were unable to
comment but who, in one case, later said ‘‘the more you think about it, the more
factors there are’’ and, in the other case, ‘‘Now I think about it, maybe mitigation
does play a bigger part than I ﬁrst indicated.’’ (Jacobson and Hough, fn. 71 above,
14).
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judges to give insuﬃcient weight to such factors even though they are
not precluded from looking at them.100 Bearing this in mind, a sen-
tencing system that wants to encourage moderate sentencing out-
comes would be well advised to provide its judges with substantial
sentencing discretion.
2.4 The Moral Character and Moral Seriousness of Judging
There is another important reason, to do with the moral dimensions
of sentencing, why substantial sentencing discretion is preferable to
merely residual discretion. It is clear from the examples given in the
previous sub-section that ‘‘Sentencing is not so much a technical or
value-neutral process as a value-laden process of constructing and
exploring the narratives of the lives of the people in the dock.’’101
Judges themselves describe sentencing as ‘‘in substantial part a moral
decision’’.102 They also leave their interlocutors in no doubt that they
perceive sentencing as an aspect of their work that calls for exercise of
their human qualities, as well as, or perhaps even more than, it calls
for application of their trained intellect. Lynn Adelman, a Wisconsin
district court judge and former Wisconsin legislator, criticises the
impact Frankel’s notion of ‘‘lawlessness in sentencing’’ has had on
judges in the United States for the reason that his ideas
have made them less thoughtful sentencers. Sentencing under numerical
guidelines is relatively easy because it requires little reasoning. Judges need not
think through the often diﬃcult questions of how the various purposes of
sentencing relate to each other in a particular case. Their principal obligation is
to calculate the applicable number – a task that generally is a mechanical one.
As a result, judges are less able to perform the task of ‘‘practical reasoning’’ in
a speciﬁc factual context that eﬀective sentencing requires.103
100 One of Ulmer and Johnson’s respondents, a public defender, remarked: ‘‘The
rules do not look as problematic to [newer judges] as they do to somebody who came
before them. … The newer judges … lean on the Guidelines a lot more than judges
did that were on the bench when the guidelines became eﬀective. … [W]ith these
[newer] judges, you really have to show them something that tells them that they
should [depart below Guidelines], you know. They still may say, Well, I recognize
that I have this discretion, but I choose not to use it.’’’(Ulmer and Johnson, fn. 17
above, 284).
101 Hough, Jacobson and Millie, fn. 78 above, 39.
102 L Adelman and J Deitrich, ‘‘Marvin Frankel’s Mistakes and the Need to
Rethink Federal Sentencing’’, (2008) 13 Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law 239, 246.
103 Adelman and Deitrich, ibid, 257 (references omitted).
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Like Duﬀ (whom she and her co-author quote) Adelman views sen-
tencing as an exercise of ‘‘a kind of judgment that is more akin to
perception (seeing what is appropriate or what will make sense) than
it is to calculation,’’104 an understanding of the sentencing process
shared by judges at every level of the judicial hierarchy whose views
are quoted in Brown’s recent book on ‘‘Criminal Sentencing as
Practical Wisdom’’.105
Importantly, it is not merely a cognitive but a moral burden which
sentencing systems that remove substantial discretion from sentenc-
ing judges take oﬀ judges’ shoulders. This burden is well described by
one respondent in Jacobson and Hough’s study on personal mitiga-
tion, who said that sentencing can be
terrifying, because it’s a very subjective exercise – there are all these objective
parameters put in place, but in the end it’s down to what one person thinks
about another.106
A U.S. judge described pre-guidelines sentencing as a time when
sentencing was ‘‘a tremendous moral burden to carry around with
you. To pronounce these sentences on people like they’re coming out
of your head, and that’s what you’re doing, and you have to sleep
with it at night (…)’’.107
To some extent, judges may insulate themselves against the moral
burden involved in having to decide another person’s fate by ﬁnding
ways of not thinking too hard about the impact a particular pun-
ishment might have on the person before them. For instance, Fitz-
maurice and Pease observe that ‘‘the use of conventional number
preferences in sentencing choice probably protects sentencers from
thinking about what a sentence means in practice.’’108 But usually
these mechanisms at least operate in a context where judges under-
stand their task as sentencers as having to set reasonable terms for
continued co-existence with an oﬀender on behalf of the polity, which
means that they are expected to take moral responsibility for the
judgment as a decision they have reached and stand behind. If ﬁxing
the length of a sentence in familiar units of months or years already
104 R A Duﬀ, ‘‘Guidance and Guidelines’’, (2005) 105 Columbia Law Review 1162,
1176; quoted in Adelman and Deitrich, ibid, 249.
105 Brown, fn. 70 above, 180–191, see also 173–174.
106 Jacobson and Hough, fn. 71 above, 48.
107 Ulmer and Johnson, fn. 17 above, 284.
108 Fitzmaurice and Pease, fn. 35 above, 113.
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encourages judges not to think too hard about what the imposition of
the sentence really means for the oﬀender’s future life and wellbeing,
how much greater is this de-sensitisation eﬀect likely to be if the
sentence does not even, in the experienced reality of the sentencer,
result from her (albeit conventional, familiar, in this way comforting)
choice but from a mere discovery that this is the sentence prescribed in
a grid for which the sentencer does not have to take any responsi-
bility?
We can get some sense of this by considering the moral and social
evil that judging under the federal sentencing guidelines has brought
over the criminal justice system in the United States.109 These
guidelines (which were treated as mandatory until 2005110) were the
perfect example of a sentencing framework that replaced sentencing
as a directly value-oriented decision with a formalistic approach.
Instead of focusing on the person before them, judges focused on
various ‘‘factual triggers’’ represented in the sentencing grid. That
grid would with near mathematical precision generate the sentence.
Having identiﬁed it, they no longer needed to think about what it
meant in human terms for the oﬀender to undergo this sentence. A
judge in a large southern district admitted to Ulmer and Johnson: ‘‘I
think eventually for many judges the guidelines provide some insu-
lation from kind of the raw human pain that is involved in sentencing
somebody.’’111 Once insulated from that, it became possible for
judges to ‘‘hide behind the guidelines’’ and (in the striking description
of one chief federal defender) ‘‘do mass sentencings, 20 or 30 hearings
a day, and just read out centuries of time.’’112
The reason why these judges lost any sense of the moral serious-
ness of what they were doing was that they no longer needed to take
moral responsibility for the sentencing decisions they made. In the
words of the judge quoted above describing pre-guidelines sentencing
as ‘‘a tremendous moral burden’’, the guidelines ‘‘absolved you,
basically, of the moral responsibility, to some extent, of whether the
sentence was too harsh, whether you should have considered some of
109 Taking stock of the extent of that evil is beyond this article. For one judge
speaking out, see ‘‘The judge who says he’s part of the gravest injustice in America’’,
press report available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/02/politics/mandatory-
minimum-sentencing-sessions/index.html.
110 In 2005, the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 made the guidelines eﬀectively advisory.
111 Ulmer and Johnson, fn. 17 above, 284.
112 Ulmer and Johnson, ibid, 285.
IN DEFENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION
these other factors, yadda, yadda, yadda.’’113 This view was echoed
by another of Ulmer and Johnson’s interviewees, a U.S. Attorney
who remarked that:
You talk to judges over drinks and some tell you that their brothers and sisters
for the most part love [the guidelines]… They love the fact that they don’t have
to make these hard calls. But then there are some that realize that, ‘‘Jesus, this
is my job’’.114
The same respondent then added: ‘‘I am sure it is those guys that are
doing the departures.’’115
The important point here is that the presence of substantial sen-
tencing discretion is linked to a more acute sense of moral respon-
sibility for the sentencing outcome by the sentencer. One of Brown’s
interviewees captures this precisely when he stresses (against a sen-
tencing system where you ‘‘more or less get a telephone book of
instructions that tell you how to sentence and it becomes a matter of
looking it up’’) that ‘‘There must always be room to say that fairness
and justice does not require this to be done or that fairness and justice
does require this to be done.’’116 It is only against the backdrop of this
possibility and obligation that a judge can, and has to, take sub-
stantive (moral) responsibility for the judgment she imposes. It is
therefore only against this backdrop that imposing sentence carries
with it the weight and personal responsibility of a moral choice,
subject to full-ﬂedged moral evaluation by the judge herself and by
others. Hence it is only against this backdrop that the seriousness of
what they do fully registers with judges. It is thus, to my mind, only
against this backdrop that judges can be expected to be fair, to do
justice. Formal responsibility that comes with exercising the authority
of the law in a particular institutional function is not enough.
This reason for substantial sentencing discretion exists in every
case that comes before a judge. A sentencer who merely ‘‘executes the
law’s commands’’, is a mere messenger or conduit, doesn’t speak
from a position where she is expected to take responsibility for the
judgment she passes as a choice she has made for reasons she can
give, and stand behind. Most sentencers shy away from doing very
bad things to other people if they cannot shove the responsibility for
113 Ulmer and Johnson, ibid, 284.
114 Ulmer and Johnson, ibid.
115 Ulmer and Johnson, ibid.
116 Brown, fn. 70 above, 171.
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this elsewhere. It is precisely this moral burden that provides the best
protection against excessive punishment, and the best assurance that
the punishments imposed are constructive, moderate and humane.
2.5 Sentencing and Respect
One of the judges interviewed by Hough et al. remarked that the very
act of sentencing is ‘‘a peculiarly naked and direct form of exercising
power over somebody’’.117 How can that ‘‘naked exercise of power’’
be reconciled with treating the person over whom it is exercised with
respect? Answering this question will help us perceive another
important reason in support of substantial sentencing discretion.
In his critical discussion of the eﬀects that mandatory sentencing
legislation had on young black and Hispanic oﬀenders in the United
States, Pillsbury observed:
Because these [extremely severe] penalties [for young oﬀenders charged with
murder arising out of gang criminality] are largely mandatory upon conviction,
when it comes time for sentencing these young people rarely get seen for who
they are, and certainly not for who they could be.118
When the law insists that punishment, in some of the most severe
cases, must be ‘‘rendered impersonally’’ [in the sense that a sentence
mandated by law must be imposed], then this ‘‘den[ies] the convicted
a meaningful opportunity to be seen and heard as a unique per-
son.’’119 Obviously, the worry would be less if the punishment was a
small ﬁne, the judicial equivalent of a slap on the wrist (say, a
speeding ticket). The reason why, for Pillsbury, it becomes oﬀensive
and unbearable that the sentence is mechanically decided upon
merely on the basis of ‘‘oﬀence classiﬁcation’’ is that the imposition
of this kind of sentence will deform the life of the person who serves it
beyond recognition – and that can only be done to someone whose
subjectivity we do not respect, engage with, or value. As Pillsbury
captures the attitude: ‘‘They are their legal record’’.120
Once we see this, the argument for ﬂexibility on the part of the
sentencing judge becomes grounded in more than the need to avoid a
disproportionately severe sentence. It is so that the judge can take a
117 Hough, Jacobson and Millie, fn. 78 above, 35.
118 S H Pillsbury, ‘‘Questioning Retribution, Valuing Humility’’, (2014) 11 Ohio
State Journal of Criminal Law 263, 278.
119 Pillsbury, ibid, 277.
120 Pillsbury, ibid, 278.
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certain position towards an oﬀender – the position that his future
matters. And why should a judge be able to take that position, why
should he even be expected to? That was again captured well by one
of Brown’s interviewees:
When I was being trained as a prosecutor, one of the ﬁrst things my boss said
to me was: ‘‘It’s prosecution in the public interest.’’ It’s the same with sen-
tencing. It’s sentencing in the public interest. Never forget that the accused is a
member of the public. So you cannot possibly, in my view, either prosecute or
sentence without considering the individual who has committed the crime.121
Sentencers and prosecutors must treat those they are dealing with as
co-citizens. They must also treat them with respect for them as per-
sons – as human beings understood in their individuality as a ‘‘locus
of value’’.122 Ultimately this is a matter of constitutional principle, a
principle well captured by Laws LJ when he remarks:
Rule-book justice is barbarous. It treats the criminal not as an individual, but
as a member of a class, to be dealt with according to the rules set to govern that
class. If the State systematically looks at its citizens, even the most ﬂawed
among them, in that grim light, then it looks at them as things not people.123
Sentencing discretion is a precondition for the judge to be in a
position to give an explanation of the sentence that is not merely an
exercise in ‘‘buck-passing’’ (‘‘I am sentencing you to 5 years because
your case falls into ﬁeld A5 of the sentencing grid. Don’t ask me to
justify this further; I didn’t make the grid.’’). This, in turn, is a pre-
condition for the very possibility of the trial court’s sentence to be
experienced and accepted by defendants as a response to their crime
that treats them as human beings. It is the duality of the sentencing
decision as a decision authorised, constrained and guided by law, and
made by a person who can hear and respond to the defendant’s pleas,
that makes it possible to say that the defendant is treated with re-
spect.
121 Brown, fn. 70 above, 97.
122 See D Wiggins, ‘‘The person as object of science, as subject of experience, and
as locus of value’’ in A R Peacocke and G R Gillett (eds), Persons and Personality,
Blackwell 1987.
123 J Laws, ‘‘The Future of Sentencing: A Perspective from the Judiciary’’, in P
Sedgwick (ed), Rethinking Sentencing – A Contribution to the Debate, London:
Church House Publishing, 2004, 67.
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2.6 Responding to Potential Objections
Ashworth is rightly critical of theories that allow judges to choose
between diﬀerent legitimate aims of sentencing. His objection is
predominantly constitutional: ‘‘Freedom to select from among the
various rationales [of sentencing] is a freedom to determine policy,
not a freedom to respond to unusual combinations of facts.’’124 He
also identiﬁes a risk that judges could engage in what he denounces as
‘‘pick and mix’’ sentencing,125 at grave cost to predictability and
consistency of sentencing outcomes. The latter worry is shared by
Cole and Manson who point out that ‘‘the blending of penal objec-
tives [in] the sentencing process … generates its own inevitable ten-
sions due to the inherently contradictory nature of some of the
objectives [and can hide] the uncomfortable observation that preci-
sion and consistency may be unattainable goals.’’126
The concern that judges invested with substantial sentencing dis-
cretion would determine policy can be lessened if one recalls that the
sentencing decision is about setting reasonable terms for the polity’s
continued relationship with the oﬀender in view of his crime. This
overall objective does not invite or indeed permit judges to base their
decisions on a ‘‘personal policy preference’’ for this or that sentencing
aim. Any choice of a particular sentencing goal over another would
have to be contextually connected to determining the appropriate
response to a particular case and a particular oﬀender. As one of the
judges interviewed by Davies et al. in their study of sentencing bur-
glars explained,
Depending on the facts, your objectives may change. Potentially there is a
range of objectives one may have. You might have protection of the public,
particularly for night time burglaries, which is why people would think a
substantial sentence would be appropriate … At the lower end of the scale …
something constructive could be done to help prevent a particular oﬀender
from oﬀending again. So one can’t say what one’s sentencing objectives are
speciﬁcally until one knows more about the case.127
124 A Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 5th edn, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012, 76.
125 Ashworth, ibid, 77.
126 D Cole and A Manson, Release from Imprisonment: The Law of Sentencing,
Parole and Judicial Review, Toronto: Carswell, 1990, 16.
127 M Davies, J-P Takala and J Tyrer, ‘‘Sentencing Burglars and Explaining the
Diﬀerences Between Jurisdictions’’, (2004) 44 British Journal of Criminology 741,
753.
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But this quotation also speaks to Ashworth’s second worry: it (ob-
liquely) mentions general deterrence, speciﬁc deterrence/incapacita-
tion (protection of the public) and rehabilitation as possible
sentencing goals and thereby implies that a straightforward choice
should be made between them. This suggests that there may be a
danger that judges will indeed exercise substantial sentencing dis-
cretion by ‘‘picking and mixing’’ sentencing goals. This could lead to
sentencing outcomes running the whole gamut of extremely harsh
sentences imposed on A for goal 1, and B for goal 2, to mild disposals
on C for goal 3 and D for goal 4, even when in each of these cases any
of the other goals could also plausibly have been made the lodestar of
the apportionment of punishment. If this were to result from sub-
stantial sentencing discretion, then this would not only make sen-
tencing outcomes unpredictable but hardly prime the system in the
direction of moderate sentences.
The response to this worry requires some clariﬁcation of the
relationship between substantial sentencing discretion and sentencing
goals. The point of substantial sentencing discretion is to allow for
properly individualised sentencing that responds not just to the of-
fence but also to the oﬀender, the court being expected to impose the
most constructive punishment possible in the circumstances. A con-
structive sentence is aimed at creating the conditions under which full
equality and full community with the perpetrator can be re-estab-
lished. It requires that sentencers remain alert to the speciﬁc matrix of
concerns raised by the case before them and avoid following a ﬁxed
policy of any sort. Take, as an unfortunate example where this was
not insisted upon, the Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Black-
shaw.128 Here, the Court of Appeal approved of a number of sen-
tences of immediate imprisonment for non-negligible periods of time
that had been imposed on individuals who had committed property
crimes that were ‘‘intrinsic’’ to the rioting and looting that took place
in various cities in England over four days in August 2011, no matter
how minor and spontaneous an oﬀender’s actions had been. In the
sentences under appeal, the trial courts had indicated that immediate
custodial sentences had been warranted to (as one of the trial judges
had put it) ‘‘demonstrate that this conduct would not be tolerated’’.
Assuming that the trial courts had treated this objective as in prin-
ciple ruling out a non-custodial sentence, then one obvious problem
with this approach is how this objective was considered at sentencing:
not as a consideration to be given the appropriate degree of weight in
128 R. v. Blackshaw [2011] EWCA Crim 2312, [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1126.
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the context of every individual case, but by attaching to it a ﬁxed
weight that preordained sentence type.
More generally, substantial sentencing discretion must be exer-
cised by performing the sort of bifocal proportionality assessment
that I have argued for in a recent publication: a proportionality
assessment that strives to arrive at a sanction which stands in an
adequate relation both to the seriousness of the oﬀence and to the
person and situation of the oﬀender.129 This approach to sentencing
combines proportionate sentencing principles with the kind of per-
son-responsive sentencing achieved through proper individualisation
of sentences. It would rule out raising an individual’s sentence based
on broad-brush considerations of the kind that ‘‘the policy of the law
must be X, from which Y must inexorably follow, no matter what’’.
Qua ‘‘policy of the law’’, a sentencing goal must be factored into the
system at the general, legislative level and is not appropriately pur-
sued at the expense of individual oﬀenders at sentencing.130 Sub-
stantial sentencing discretion is not a licence to choose between and
pursue policy goals in an impersonal manner; it is about creating the
space for a nuanced decision that sets reasonable terms, on behalf of
the polity, for continued coexistence with the oﬀender in respect of
his crime. In the main, this calls on judges to consider personal factors
in sentencing with a view to mitigating the severity of the punishment
and where possible give it some constructive form. We should tread
very carefully before we also instruct judges to look out for a personal
factor that should actively signal to them that the punishment should
go up (rather than by its absence suggesting that the punishment
should not go down). That risk exists when judges are instructed to
increase punishments on grounds of a defendant’s supposed dan-
gerousness. How to control against that risk must be the subject of
129 A du Bois-Pedain, ‘‘Punishment as an Inclusionary Practice: Sentencing in a
Liberal Constitutional State’’ in A du Bois-Pedain, M Ulva¨ng and P Asp (eds),
Criminal Law and the Authority of the State, Oxford: Hart/Bloomsbury, 2017, 199,
215–224.
130 In their comparative study of sentencing burglary cases, Davies et al. found
that Finnish judges appeared more reluctant to engage in balancing diﬀerent sen-
tencing goals than their English counterparts, observing that the Finnish judges
‘‘seemed to rely on the idea that the criminal justice system as a whole would work
towards balanced goals’’ and, in particular, that ‘‘many of them emphasized the goal
of general prevention not as something that should drive individual sentencing
decisions but as something that the whole criminal justice system would help pro-
mote’’ (fn. 127 above, 764). This captures well the attitude of sentencers that I argue
for in the text.
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another publication. All that can be observed here is that much can
be said for simply excluding this sort of consideration in most cases.
Germany, which uses a two-track system, has a few hundred convicts
in ‘‘continuing detention’’ based on their dangerousness131 whereas
England and Wales stacked up thousands in a ﬂash after introducing
a formulaic legal dangerousness indicator,132 and even when the
imposition of this type of sentence had become discretionary rather
than mandatory the courts used it extensively.133
III CONCLUSION
In the deeper and dustier recesses of a criminology library, I once
stumbled across a book of courtroom anecdotes which, in the present
context, is only notable for its title: ‘‘Nehmen Sie das Urteil an?
Menschen vor dem Richter’’.134 ‘‘Do you accept the court’s judg-
ment?’’ is indeed the question German judges traditionally ask the
accused after pronouncing the sentence in court. Judges ask it in part
for a procedural reason: if the accused plans to appeal his conviction
or sentence, the judge may not abbreviate the written reasons for his
judgment. But the question also encapsulates something about the
special, interactive character of the criminal court’s sentencing
occasion. It is odd to think of this question being asked in civil cases
131 Germany, a country with a signiﬁcantly larger population than England and
Wales, kept 524 prisoners in continuing detention on ground of dangerousness in
2016. For the preceding 13 years, the total was below that ﬁgure except in 2010,
when it also reached 524. Figures available at: https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/
studie/75094/umfrage/strafgefangene-in-sicherungsverwahrung/.
132 Indeterminate sentences of imprisonment for public protection (IPP) were
introduced as mandatory sentences for certain kinds of recidivist oﬀenders in section
225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In 2008 the wording was amended to state that
a court ‘‘may’’ impose an IPP if (also slightly amended) stipulated conditions were
met. The numbers of prisoners serving IPP sentences reached 4,461 in June 2008 and
peaked at 6,080 in June 2012 (Pat Strickland, Sentences of Imprisonment for Public
Protection, London: House of Commons Library, Parliamentary Brieﬁng Paper
Number 06086, 9 December 2016, 6). In 2012 IPP sentences were ﬁnally abolished,
but in the same breath the possibility of a dangerousness-based sentence extension
for up to 10 years, again for certain classes recidivist oﬀenders, was introduced
(section 226A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as amended).
133 J Jacobson and M Hough, Unjust Deserts: Imprisonment for Public Protection,
London: Prison Reform Trust, 2010, 8 (pointing out that there was ‘‘continuing
steady usage of the IPP sentence by the courts’’).
134 ‘‘Do you accept the court’s judgment? People before the judge’’.
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(where the court’s judgment is merely ‘‘announced’’, often quite some
time after any court hearing, and usually to an empty room). And this
has to do with what the subtitle of this otherwise unremarkable
collection of stories also captures: that, here, one human being stands
before another human being, the latter invested with authority and
thus in a position of power over the other. No matter that the source
of the authority is public and collective: it is still not the abstract
collectivity but another human individual who speaks. Lord Judge,
who ended his judicial career as Lord Chief Justice, was surely right
when he said that:
sentencing a fellow human being is … a human skill, a skill in humanity, and
… it is this skill, and its application, that is embodied in the possibly pompous
sounding phrase, ‘‘judicial discretion’’.135
To exercise that human skill, judges need substantial sentencing
discretion. A judge must be able to engage directly in a nuanced
manner with the moral issues raised by a case, and – just as impor-
tantly – with the people before him. That such an engagement hap-
pens within the broad framework set by law, and in exercise of an
authority conferred by the polity in the public interest, is understood
as placing on the judge an obligation to consider what terms the
polity ought reasonably to set for its continued interactions with the
oﬀender in view of his crime. The seriousness of a particular violation
of the law must be gauged concretely and not in the abstract, and the
same is true for the appropriateness of the sanctioning response. A
way forward must be found, and charted. It is true that the judgment
must also mark the seriousness of what happened – if it was indeed
serious – but this, too, cannot be done in a schematic or formulaic
way. To help oﬀenders turn their lives around isn’t, nor can it be, the
only consideration that shapes the punishment, but it is rightly one
which can become determinative of the type and severity of punish-
ment imposed in particular cases. This is an important upshot of a
criminal justice system that expects judges to set reasonable terms of
future coexistence with an oﬀender on behalf of the polity.
Suﬃcient dispositional ﬂexibility on the part of sentencing judges
to allow them to impose the most appropriate sentence in the cir-
cumstances is not only a functional necessity in any system that oﬀers
a range of dispositional options with a view to enabling constructive
135 I Judge, ‘‘Current Sentencing Issues’’, Address delivered at Lincoln’s Inn, 29
October 2007, London.
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punishments to be imposed. This kind of system also gives eﬀect to
the constitutional commitment to only proportionate curtailment of
each other’s rights that binds the polity also in its responses to those
convicted of criminal oﬀences. The political-constitutional case for
substantial sentencing discretion further builds on the relations of
respect that can only be manifested when the judge is expected to, and
in a position to, take responsibility for the punishment imposed. A
power to reshape an individual’s relationship with the rest of us in
response to a crime she has committed can only be exercised justiﬁ-
ably if the power-holder is prepared to engage with the oﬀender as a
human person. This is at the heart of a constitutional case for indi-
vidualised (or person-responsive) sentencing.
It might be objected that the view defended here only ﬁts sen-
tencing systems which accept that criminal punishment is about set-
ting appropriate terms for the future interaction between the oﬀender
and the polity in view of the oﬀender’s crime, and that it therefore
holds no relevance for systems where the task of the trial court is not
conceptualised in this way (but rather, say, as imposing deserved
retribution or as deterring crime). To object thus would be to
misunderstand the position advanced here. What underlies it is a
twofold conviction: First, that in every legal system, no matter what
penal philosophy is taken to underpin their sentencing practices, the
sentencing judgment must and will serve this term-setting function.
Second, that in all legal systems which recognise people as holders of
fundamental rights, are committed to treating them with respect for
their dignity and personhood, and expect their public institutions to
serve the interests of all (in other words, systems which have made the
familiar constitutional commitments of liberal-democratic states),
only a sentencing framework that calls for individualisation of sen-
tences can be justiﬁed as leading to appropriate and non-arbitrary
exercises of state power.
Note that this is not an argument for unfettered or unaccount-
able sentencing discretion. Any sentencing system, however one de-
signs it, exposes individuals to the dangers of power being exercised
ineptly or maliciously. While I have made a case here that substantial
sentencing discretion should be a feature of our sentencing system, it
is a feature that must be embedded in a broader setting of appro-
priately designed institutional safeguards.
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